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JAILING BLACK BABIES 
 
James G. Dwyer* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In reaction to the tremendous increase in incarceration of poor and minority-
race adults, perceiving that such adults suffer from losing not only liberty but also 
family ties, and citing the damage that children suffer from parental incarceration, 
advocates for prisoners have promoted programs to increase inmates’ contact with 
their children. When convinced that such programs reduce criminal recidivism, 
legislators and prison officials have approved and funded such programs. As 
described in Part I, children-in-prison programs, which predominantly involve 
children of minority race, range widely in the degree to which they make prison a 
part of children’s lives. At the extreme, there is a fast-growing phenomenon of 
states placing newborn children into prisons to live for months or years with their 
incarcerated mothers, mostly in separate units termed “prison nurseries.” 
Prison nurseries have not come at the urging of advocates for children, and 
they have proceeded without research support for any hope of positive child 
welfare outcomes.1 As explained in Part II, there is still no evidence that increased 
contact with incarcerated parents is on balance good for children, whereas there is 
much reason to believe that bringing children into prisons is detrimental for them 
and that this is especially true for minority-race children. Indeed, there is also no 
evidence that the programs serve the aim of reducing recidivism. That advocates 
for prison inmates are inclined to support placement of babies in adult prisons, 
without empirical basis for believing it is good for the children and without 
seriously considering the obvious alternative of adoption, betrays their willingness 
to use children in an instrumental way to ameliorate the suffering of disadvantaged 
adults. 
Further evidence of this instrumental attitude toward predominantly minority-
race babies is the complete absence of consideration about whether prison 
nurseries transgress legal limits on states’ power to put people in prison. Yet, there 
certainly are limits, ones of tremendous importance to adults. The fact that some 
persons are dependent and not self-determining cannot possibly mean they have no 
                                                     
* © 2014 James G. Dwyer. Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary 
School of Law. This Article reflects an extraordinary amount of research, much of it quite 
challenging. It would not have been possible without the exceptional work of librarian Paul 
Hellyer and research assistants Kaitlin Gratton, Elizabeth Herron, Claire de Jong, Kylie 
Madsen, Rebecca Pensak, Thomas O’Connor, and Lily Saffer. 
1 See CHANDRA KRING VILLANUEVA, WOMEN’S PRISON ASS’N, MOTHERS, INFANTS 
AND IMPRISONMENT: A NATIONAL LOOK AT PRISON NURSERIES AND COMMUNITY-BASED 
ALTERNATIVES 15 (2009) (“Though the number of prison nursery and community-based 
residential parenting programs has increased steadily over the last ten years, little research 
has been conducted on the impact of these programs.”). 
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right against confinement with adult criminals in state penal institutions. Indeed, 
there would likely be widespread public outrage if any state began putting mentally 
disabled or senile adults in prisons with incarcerated relatives in the hope that this 
would reduce recidivism and provide some benefits to those incompetent adults. 
Part III of this Article therefore presents the first analysis ever of how 
constitutional and statutory rules governing incarceration and civil commitment 
should apply to programs under which the state places children in prisons. It 
concludes that existing programs patently violate children’s Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. If such imprisonment 
were ever constitutionally permissible, it could only be after an individualized 
determination by a competent state authority, based on clear and convincing 
evidence, that it is necessary, in order to avoid substantial harm to a particular 
child, for the state to place that child in prison rather than in any available non-
incarceration alternative placement, including adoption. No existing prison nursery 
program satisfies this test. In addition, prison nurseries violate statutory 
prohibitions on housing minors with incarcerated adults—laws enacted with 
juvenile delinquents in mind but whose language and underlying premises extend 
to all children. Thus, prison nurseries clearly contravene constitutional rights of 
and statutory protections for children, and states should discontinue them 
immediately. 
 
II.  THE CHILDREN-IN-PRISON PHENOMENON 
 
United States prisons currently hold nearly 1.6 million people.2 Women 
constitute approximately 7% of those inmates, with more than 110,000.3 Their 
numbers have increased dramatically in recent decades, as has occurred also in 
many other countries.4 Women are most commonly imprisoned for violent 
                                                     
2 E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 1 (2012), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11 
.pdf; see also E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012, at 1 (2013), available at www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf (detailing the trends in the prisoner population for 2012). 
3 CARSON & SABOL, supra note 2, at 2. 
4 REBECCA PROJECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., MOTHERS 
BEHIND BARS: A STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD AND ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL POLICIES ON 
CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING WOMEN AND THE EFFECT 
ON THEIR CHILDREN 9–10 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT CARD] (stating a fourfold increase 
over three decades). In California, the number increased from 1,232 in 1979 to 11,416 in 
2007. See Angela Wolf et al., The Incarceration of Women in California, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 
139, 140 (2008). These trends are not unique to the United States; Europe has also seen an 
escalation in the female prison population. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WOMEN’S HEALTH 
IN PRISON: CORRECTING GENDER INEQUITY IN PRISON HEALTH 12 (2009), available at http: 
//www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/Declaration_Kyiv_Women_60 
s_health_in_Prison.pdf. 
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offenses including murder, assault, and robbery (34%); property crimes such as 
burglary, larceny, and fraud (30%); and drug offenses, predominantly trafficking 
(27%).5 The great majority have prior criminal charges when arrested for the crime 
that triggers incarceration.6 The average prison sentence of a convict who is a 
mother is over four years.7 
Most female criminals leave children behind in their communities when they 
enter prison,8 though more than a third of these mothers were not living with their 
children prior to arrest.9 Furthermore, instead of or in addition to leaving children 
behind, at least 5% of female convicts are pregnant when they enter prison,10 and 
an unknown number of other women become pregnant while in prison from 
voluntary or involuntary sex with guards.11 As a result, roughly two thousand 
babies are born to prison inmates in the U.S. each year.12 
Most children with a parent in prison are of minority race.13 Whereas the 
general U.S. population is approximately 64% white, 16% Hispanic, and 13% 
                                                     
5 See PAUL GUERINO ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PRISONERS IN 2010, at 7, 28, 30 (2011); LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR 
MINOR CHILDREN 22 (2008). It is a frequently asserted myth that the “War on Drugs” is the 
cause of mass incarceration in the United States, but in fact the primary explanation for the 
great swelling of the prison population before 1990 is an explosion of violent crime. See 
John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1087–89 (2013).  
6 See, e.g., JULIE KOWITZ MARGOLIES & TAMAR KRAFT-STOLAR, WOMEN IN PRISON 
PROJECT, WHEN “FREE” MEANS LOSING YOUR MOTHER: THE COLLISION OF CHILD 
WELFARE AND THE INCARCERATION OF WOMEN IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2006). See also 
infra note 101. 
7 See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, “SPECIAL REPORT: INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN” 6–7 (2000) 
(providing statistics about prison sentences for mothers in federal and state prison). 
8 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 2; Susan M. George, Incarcerated Mothers 
and Their Children: A Decade Long Overview, in WOMEN AND GIRLS IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICY ISSUES AND PRACTICE STRATEGIES 18-1, 18-4 (Russ Immarigeon 
ed., 2006) [hereinafter WOMEN AND GIRLS] (noting that most incarcerated mothers gave 
birth to four or more children). 
9 See MARGOLIES & KRAFT-STOLAR, supra note 6, at 3; GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, 
supra note 5, at 4.  
10 LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF JAIL 
INMATES 1 (2006); Drika Weller Makariev & Phillip R. Shaver, Attachment, Parental 
Incarceration and Possibilities for Intervention: An Overview, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM. 
DEV. 311, 312 (2010). 
11 See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text (discussing sexual abuse of female 
inmates by guards). 
12 Jenni Vainik, The Reproductive and Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers, 46 
FAM. CT. REV. 670, 676 (2008). 
13 SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND 
THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991–2007, at 1 (2009), available at http://www.sentencingproj 
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black,14 half of the children with a parent in prison are black, only one-fourth are 
white, and most of the rest are Hispanic.15 Black and Hispanic children are 
respectively 7.5 and 2.5 times more likely to have a parent in prison than white 
children. One-third of children whose mothers are in prison live primarily with 
their fathers, while most of the rest are left in the care of a grandmother or other 
relative.16 For roughly one-tenth of imprisoned mothers, their children are in foster 
care,17 but nearly all of those children were already in foster care prior to the 
mother’s conviction.18 Contrary to the claims of some advocates for women 
prisoners,19 it is rare for a child to go into foster care because a parent enters 
                                                     
ect.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_incarceratedparents.pdf (reporting that over 70% 
of the 1.7 million children in America with a parent in prison in 2007 were “children of 
color”). 
14 See KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND 
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/brie 
fs/c2010br-02.pdf. 
15 See SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (showing black children were 51% in 
1997 and 45% in 2007 of all children with a parent in prison). In 2010, the female prison 
population was approximately 46% white, 25% black, and 18% Hispanic. See GUERINO ET 
AL., supra note 5, at 26. This suggests minority-race inmates have a higher average number 
of children. 
16 SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.  
17 See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 5; SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 
5. 
18 See Deseriee A. Kennedy, “The Good Mother”: Mothering, Feminism, and 
Incarceration, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 173 (2012) (noting a study of 
incarcerated women in Illinois which found that the majority “had a child in state care prior 
to the woman’s imprisonment”); Marilyn C. Moses, Correlating Incarcerated Mothers, 
Foster Care, and Mother-Child Reunification, CORRS. TODAY Oct. 2006, at 98, 98 (finding 
“a child’s foster care status is rarely a direct result of a mother’s imprisonment”). 
19 See, e.g., An Act Establishing a Child Nursery Facility at the Connecticut 
Correctional Institution, Niantic: Hearing on H.B. 6642 Before the Judiciary Comm. 
(Conn. 2013) [hereinafter Alexander’s Testimony] (testimony of Amanda Alexander, 
member of Women, Incarceration, and Family Law Project at Yale Law School, asserting 
that “[i]ncarcerated mothers are at particularly high risk of having their children placed in 
foster care, as most are primary caretakers of the children before arrest”); Michal Gilad & 
Tal Gat, U.S. v. Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution for Children of 
Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 376 (2013) (“[I]t is reported 
that many incarcerated mothers with children in foster care are unable to meet court-
mandated family reunification requirements for contact and visitation with their children, 
and consequently lose their parental rights.”); Alexandria Gutierrez, Sufferings Peculiarly 
Their Own: The Thirteenth Amendment, in Defense of Incarcerated Women’s Reproductive 
Rights, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 117, 164 & n.354 (2013) (advocating 
women’s reproductive rights in the prison context under the Thirteenth Amendment and 
asserting that children are taken away to foster care); Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster 
Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1494 (2012) 
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prison; even with children born before their mother’s incarceration, this occurs in 
less than 2% of cases.20 It is even rarer for babies born to inmates to be placed 
immediately for adoption, as that occurs only if the mother chooses to relinquish 
the child for adoption.21  
 
A.  Range of Program Types 
 
Traditionally, incarceration entailed a nearly complete severance of ties with 
family, friends, and community. Indeed, loss of gratifying intimate relationships is 
part of the suffering that makes imprisonment a deterrent to criminal activity. 
However, motivated principally by a belief that they can reduce recidivism 
following convicts’ release, legislators and prison administrators have in recent 
years adopted new programs to increase communication and contact between 
inmates and their families—in particular, their offspring.22 
Some such programs involve simply more communication between parents 
and children. A number of men’s prisons, for example, have introduced parenting 
programs that encourage fathers to write letters to their children or record 
themselves reading books.23 A small number of male prisons go beyond normal 
visitation procedures to facilitate greater personal contact with children by 
allowing more private and extended visits or furloughs (i.e., brief returns of the 
inmates to the community).24 
                                                     
(asserting that “[i]mmediately after delivery, their newborns are automatically placed in 
foster care in the vast majority of states”). 
20 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ROSS ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, HARD DATA ON HARD 
TIMES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION, FOSTER CARE, AND 
VISITATION 9–10 (2004) (finding that 85% of the children of incarcerated women in New 
York who are in foster care were in foster care before the mother’s arrest that led to 
incarceration), available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/vera/245_461.pdf. Cf. infra 
notes 62–66 and accompanying text (outlining the legal barriers to state involvement and 
the substantial likelihood that other family will care for the children). 
21 See infra notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
22 See Dave Ghose, Nursery Program Aids Jailed Moms in Four States, STATELINE 
(Sept. 24, 2002), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/nursery-program-ai 
ds-jailed-moms-in-four-states-85899392756. 
23 See, e.g., Rachel D. Costa, Now I Lay Me Down to Sleep: A Look at Overnight 
Visitation Rights Available to Incarcerated Mothers, 29 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 67, 92–93 (2003) (describing the D.C. Family Literacy Project, a family 
education program for inmates as part of two-step process leading to visits with children); 
‘Promising Practices’: Program Helps NM Inmates Be Active Part of Family, DEMING 
HEADLIGHT (Nov. 5, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.demingheadlight.com/ci_13715604 
(describing the Strengthening Families Initiative Incarcerated Fathers Program, which 
provides parenting education classes requiring inmates to create books and cards for their 
children). 
24 See, e.g., Costa, supra note 23, at 88–89 (describing the park-like area of a 
Louisiana penitentiary where fathers can have a picnic and playtime with their children); 
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More dramatic new programs have proliferated in women’s prisons. Most 
female prisons now have special areas and longer hours for mother-child visits.25 
Many have parenting programs for female inmates that entail young children 
spending several hours a week in supervised group play sessions with their 
mothers.26 Some allow furloughs so mothers can spend time with their children in 
a more natural, community setting.27 And some are going further and having 
children stay overnight in prisons. For example, the Tennessee Prison for Women 
allows inmates to have children under six stay with them for one weekend per 
month.28  
 
B.  Prison Nurseries 
 
The most extreme effort to connect incarcerated women with their children is 
a fast-growing trend to create prison nurseries, units within prisons where infants 
live full-time with their mothers. New York State has operated one at Bedford 
Hills, a maximum-security prison forty miles north of New York City, for over a 
century. In the mid-twentieth century, a dozen or so other states allowed 
incarcerated mothers to keep their children in prison with them, but they 
discontinued the practice in the 1970s, a time of increased consciousness regarding 
children’s rights, citing concerns about children’s safety and well-being.29  
                                                     
Brian Handwerk, Mothers Behind Bars: What Happens to the Children?, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/06/0613_030613_pris 
onkids.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2004) (describing weekend afternoon programs in 
Louisiana women’s prisons). 
25 Joycelyn M. Pollack, A National Survey of Parenting Programs in Women’s 
Prisons in the U.S., in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 19-6. 
26 See, e.g., REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 21 (describing Oregon’s Coffee Creek 
Correctional Facility Parenting Inside Out program); Costa, supra note 23, at 89–91, 93–94 
(describing family time and model parenting programs in North Carolina, Kansas, and New 
York). 
27 Pollack, supra note 25, at 19-6 to 19-7. 
28 See Jennifer L. Fiorica, Note, How the Constitution Can Preserve the Strength of 
Existing Familial Bonds and Foster New Relationships Between Female Inmates and Their 
Children, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 49, 53 (2007) (describing overnight visitation 
programs in women’s prisons in New York, Delaware, and South Dakota); Erin Quinn, 
Women’s Prison Works to Make Inmates Better Mothers, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Nov. 1, 
2010. 
29 See Paul La Rosa, Babies Behind Bars In 3 New York Prisons, Inmates Who Give 
Birth May Keep Their Babies with Them. Dr. Spock Endorsed the Idea, but Critics are 
Queasy, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-12/news/vw-
1747_1_baby-food; see also Leda M. Pojman, Cuffed Love: Do Prison Babies Ever Smile?, 
10 BUFF. WOMEN’S L. J. 46, 55 (2001–2002). Pojman notes that a survey in 1981 showed 
widely divergent views among prison administrators about the advisability of having 
children live in prisons. Id. at 56. 
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In recent years, however, the idea of babies living in prison has quietly taken 
on new life, as seven states—Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Nebraska, South Dakota, 
Washington, and West Virginia—have joined New York in operating prison 
nurseries, in at least one case with federal funding.30 Another state, Wyoming, is in 
the process of creating one.31 In some states, prison officials have discretion to 
place children in prison with birth mothers even in the absence of a special nursery 
unit.32 The numbers of states, programs, and children living in adult prisons are 
likely to increase rapidly. The U.S. Department of Justice issued a call for grant 
proposals to develop more prison nursery programs in 2010,33 advocates advance 
prison nursery legislative proposals in additional states each year,34 and a recent 
report exclaimed that “unprecedented bi-partisan support currently exists for 
                                                     
30 VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 27–33; Ken Kusmer, Nursery Programs Allow 
Imprisoned Moms, Newborns to Bond, SEATTLE TIMES (May 11, 2008), http://seattletimes. 
com/html/nationworld/2004405371_apbabiesbehindbars.html (stating that Indiana lau-
nched its program of imprisoning babies with a grant from the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services). Several states also or instead offer “community treatment 
programs” under which a more select group of women with young children leave prison 
and live in a more homelike setting while still under state supervision. See, e.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 3411 (West 2011) (establishing a community treatment program for women 
inmates with children under six years old); Rehabilitation Programs Division: Baby and 
Mother Bonding Initiative (BAMBI), TEX. DEP’T OF CRIM. JUSTICE, http://www.tdcj.state.tx 
.us/divisions/rpd/rpd_bambi.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) (describing Texas’s 
rehabilitation program, BAMBI, that allows offender mothers and their infants to bond in a 
residential facility); see also KAREN SHAIN ET AL., CALIFORNIA’S MOTHER-INFANT PRISON 
PROGRAMS: AN INVESTIGATION 1 (2010) (describing six small, community-based facilities 
for mother-child coresidence). But see id. (concluding that “[t]he programs are not 
sufficiently ‘child friendly’, with the children’s needs not met”); id. at 19 (noting that some 
mothers thought the facilities dangerous for their children). These community-based 
programs call for a somewhat different analysis outside this Article’s scope. 
31 Sara Hossaini, Plans Underway for New Prison Nursery in Lusk, WYO. PUB. 
MEDIA (Mar. 19, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/plans-underway-ne 
w-prison-nursery-lusk. 
32 See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-6-2(g) (2012) (authorizing prison officials to 
keep children in prison up to age six); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS., § 9-601(f) 
(LexisNexis 2008) (no age limit); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 
2014) (providing prison officials discretion to keep a child in prison with the mother until 
the child reaches age one, except in extenuating circumstances under which the child may 
remain until 18-months old). 
33 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY-BASED PRISONER SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 
PROGRAM, FY 2010 COMPETITIVE GRANT ANNOUNCEMENT 1 (2010). 
34 Connecticut is now poised to join the list of states that place babies in prison. See 
H.B. 5569, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2014). In 2011 and 2012, some Massachusetts 
legislators proffered a bill relating to incarcerated women that included this provision: 
“Every effort shall be made to keep infants of twelve months or less born to incarcerated 
mothers with their mothers.” H.B. 2234, 187th Gen. Assemb. (Mass. 2011). 
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rehabilitative services for inmates, especially those, like prison nursery programs, 
that decrease recidivism.”35  
A child’s life in prison can extend to up to three years of age in Washington 
State and up to eighteen months in most of the other states.36 Most programs 
ostensibly limit participation to mothers whose expected release date is before the 
child will reach the maximum age,37 who have no history of convictions for violent 
crime or criminal child maltreatment, and who have no recent misbehavior 
reports.38 However, some states do not impose such limitations.39 Moreover, the 
focus on criminal convictions for child abuse in the rules of most prison nursery 
programs40 means the great majority of women who have previously committed 
child maltreatment can still have their babies placed in prison with them. Criminal 
prosecution for child maltreatment committed by mothers is rare—a substantial 
percentage of maltreatment incidents are never reported; in most reported 
instances, child protection services (CPS) is unable to substantiate the 
maltreatment, CPS refers only about 15% of substantiated maltreatment other than 
sexual abuse (which is almost never the kind of maltreatment mothers commit) for 
criminal investigation; and only a fraction of cases referred for criminal 
                                                     
35 Lorie Smith Goshin & Mary Woods Byrne, Converging Streams of Opportunity for 
Prison Nursery Programs in the United States, 48 J. OFFENDER REHABILITATION 271, 276 
(2009). 
36 VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 10. Nebraska prison officials have discretion to 
authorize a stay longer than eighteen months. Id. at 28. 
37 See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-57 (2005) (stating that a mother’s sentence 
must be eighteen months or less). 
38 See Tiffany Walden, A Years-Long Struggle for Prison Moms, CITY LIMITS (May 
23, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4334/a-years-long-struggle-for-prison-m 
oms#.Uu2QpmRDujI. 
39 See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2014) (entitling 
women to enter the nursery without limitation based on length of sentence); Jessica L. 
Borelli et al., Attachment Organization in a Sample of Incarcerated Mothers: Distribution 
of Classifications and Associations with Substance Abuse History, Depressive Symptoms, 
Perceptions of Parenting Competency and Social Support, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 
355, 360 (2010) (noting that among mothers in New York prison nurseries included in a 
study, “sentences ranged from two months to 10 years”); Mary Woods Byrne et al., 
Intergenerational Transmission of Attachment for Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, 12 
ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 375, 380 (2010) (noting that some mothers in New York 
prison nurseries have felony convictions for assault, robbery, and/or burglary). Illinois has 
no categorical limitations; a committee makes a subjective eligibility determination based 
on numerous factors, including length of sentence and behavioral history. See 20 ILL. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 475.25 (2013).  
40 See, e.g., OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120-9-57 (2005) (requiring that an inmate “has 
never been convicted of a violent crime or any type of child abuse, or child 
endangerment”). Nebraska’s program manual suggests civil child abuse adjudications can 
also disqualify a woman. NEB. CORR. CTR. FOR WOMEN, NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., 
OPERATIONAL MEMORANDUM, NURSERY PROGRAM 3 (2012). 
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investigation result in a conviction.41 In addition, states that have rules excluding 
women based on their history or length of sentence might not implement them very 
carefully. For example, an Ohio report found that a significant percentage of the 
children living in prison were mistakenly put there even though their mothers had 
histories of violent crime or overly long sentences.42 
Bedford Hills is the only maximum-security prison for women in New York 
State, so it houses the most serious female criminals.43 Its nursery unit can house 
twenty-nine mother-baby dyads at a time.44 While in the program, women attend 
parenting classes and substance abuse programs and receive counseling on 
preparing for life after release.45 When mothers are receiving these services or 
performing prison jobs, other inmates come in from the general population to 
provide day care.46 The most recent report of the nursery residents’ demographics 
notes that over 60% of the babies who have begun their lives in Bedford Hills 
                                                     
41 See Ted Cross, Children & Family Research Ctr., U. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign, 
The Criminal Justice Response to Child Abuse: Lessons Learned and Future Directions for 
Research and Practice, http://cfrc.illinois.edu/pubs/pt_20120701_TheCriminalJusticeResp 
onseToChildAbuseLessonsLearnedAndFutureDirectionsForResearchAndPractice.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014) (presenting national statistics on CPS referrals to law enforcement 
for different types of maltreatment, the percentage of referrals that result in prosecution, 
and the percentage of prosecutions that result in conviction); see also 55 PA. CODE 
§ 3490.92 (2008) (requiring that child protection workers refer cases to prosecutors only if 
they are cases of child abuse (not neglect) involving homicide, sexual abuse or 
exploitation, or serious bodily injury); Statistics on Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, available at http://www.victimsofcrime.org/media/rep 
orting-on-child-sexual-abuse/statistics-on-perpetrators-of-csa (last visited Mar. 30, 2014) 
(noting that only a small percentage of sexual abuse perpetrators are female, including 
females who abuse children other than their own); Investigating Child Abuse and Crimes 
Against Children in Pennsylvania, PROTECT OUR CHILDREN COMM., http://www.protectpac 
hildren.org/files/child-protection-report-investigations-may-2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 
2014) (quoting child protection officials as saying, “In the vast majority of suspected 
physical abuse cases, we are prohibited from contacting law enforcement.”). 
42 See TINA L. MAWHORR, OHIO DEP’T REHAB. & CORR., EVALUATION OF THE 
ACHIEVING BABY CARE SUCCESS NURSERY PROGRAM 7 (2006) (finding that three out of 
seventy women were in the nursery despite not meeting the eligibility criteria). 
43 See Facility Listing, N.Y. DEP’T OF CORRS. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, http://www.doc 
cs.ny.gov/faclist.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
44 See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 378–79. 
45 See Walden, supra note 38 (“Mothers must attend substance abuse programs and 
take pre- and post-natal classes, addressing any addictions that put them in prison while 
learning how to improve their parenting skills simultaneously.”). 
46 See Gilad and Gat, supra note 19, at 375; Leslie Flowers, Prison Babies, 
NURSE.COM (Nov. 17, 2008), http://news.nurse.com/article/20081117/NY02/111170078#. 
Uuf_5HkQFO0 (describing the vocational programs inmates attend); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
20, § 475.20(f)(2) (2013).  
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prison were black and over a quarter were Hispanic, whereas only one tenth were 
white.47 
New York law creates a presumption that every woman who delivers a baby 
while incarcerated may, if she chooses,48 keep the baby with her in prison: 
 
A child so born may be returned with its mother to the correctional 
institution in which the mother is confined unless the chief medical 
officer of the correctional institution shall certify that the mother is 
physically unfit to care for the child . . . . A child may remain in the 
correctional institution with its mother for such period as seems desirable 
for the welfare of such child, but not after it is one year of age, provided, 
however, if the mother . . . is to be paroled shortly after the child 
becomes one year of age, such child may remain at the state reformatory 
until its mother is paroled, but in no case after the child is eighteen 
months old.49 
 
The same New York law allows a woman who is nursing a baby under one 
year of age at the time she enters prison to bring the baby with her.50 The law 
applies to “any institution” where a woman is confined, not just to prisons where 
there is a special nursery unit.51  
New York law does not limit participation to women whose sentence will end 
before the baby must leave the prison, nor does it automatically exclude women 
with histories of violence or child maltreatment.52 Moreover, despite the law’s 
                                                     
47 See Joseph R. Carlson Jr., Prison Nurseries: A Pathway to Crime-Free Futures, 34 
CORRECTIONS COMPENDIUM 17, 18 (2009) (studying the racial demographics of the 
mothers and finding that “the female inmates in New York’s programs had the following 
demographics: . . . 61 percent were black, 26 percent were Hispanic and 11 percent were 
white”). 
48 See Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 874 (1973) (“[T]he discretion to bring the 
child into the institution rests with the inmate mother. . . .”); Mary W. Byrne et al., The 
Drew House Story: Collaborating on Alternatives for Incarcerated Women and Their 
Children, 28 CRIM. JUST. 25, 26 (2013) (“New York is unique among the seven states that 
currently have nursery facilities in that all incarcerated pregnant women have not only the 
option but the legislatively protected entitlement (N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611) to use the 
prison nursery program unless they are judged unfit for motherhood.”). 
49 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2014). 
50 Id. § 611(3). 
51 Id. § 611(1). 
52 See Byrne et al., supra note 48, at 26 (“New York has not established the same 
strict eligibility limitations as have other states with prison nursery programs, and 
participants are more likely to have a broader range of crimes and sentence lengths than 
elsewhere.”); Kelsey Kauffman, Prison Nurseries: New Beginnings and Second Chances, 
in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 20-1, 20-4 (stating that officials have placed in 
Bedford Hills babies whose birth mothers had long sentences for violent crimes); Natasha 
Haverty, When Should Babies Stay with Their Moms in NY Prisons?, N. COUNTRY PUB. 
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reference to children’s welfare, there is no legal requirement in New York that an 
authority competent to make such a judgment conduct a best-interests assessment 
and conclude that imprisonment is the best available alternative for a child, before 
the state puts that child in prison, nor that any qualified persons conduct an 
ongoing review of the infants’ well-being.53 Prison administrators conduct the 
screening.54 Thus, regardless of what the circumstances would be for the child, any 
prison warden can order transfer of a baby from a birthing facility to the prison to 
live with the birth mother for a year or more, if the mother so requests. Even a 
petition for custody from the baby’s legal father appears to be insufficient to block 
prison officials from sending his child to live in prison.55 
Illinois’s program is typical of the new wave of prison nursery experiments. It 
has one nursery, in its Decatur Correctional Center for women.56 Prison officials 
screen inmate applicants to decide which babies will live in the nursery. In Illinois 
this is done by subjective assessment taking into account numerous vague criteria 
such as length of sentence and nature of criminal history, rather than by applying 
categorical limitations.57 The nursery is in a segregated unit, where each mother 
has her own room adjoined to a central area decorated and furnished much like a 
                                                     
RADIO (July 15, 2013), http://www.northcountrypublicradio.org/news/story/22352/201307 
15/when-should-babies-stay-with-their-moms-in-ny-prisons (discussing a baby living in 
Bedford Hills prison with a mother serving a fifteen-year sentence for first-degree 
manslaughter). 
53 See Kauffman, supra note 52, at 20-1, 20-3 to -4 (stating that the admission 
restrictions of the Ohio Reformatory for Women, which exclude violent offenders and 
women with previous charges of child endangerment, are not automatically applied to 
inmate mothers in New York). 
54 See Haverty, supra note 52 (stating that the deputy superintendent of programs 
decides which inmates are admitted to the nursery program). 
55 See Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872, 875 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (overturning a 
decision to exclude a child, stating that “even the father does not have the power under this 
statute to countermand the decision of an inmate mother to keep her child”). In contrast, 
Illinois regulations require permission of the father, if he is known and available, for a baby 
to live in prison. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20 § 475.20(f)(5) (2013).  
56 VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 27. 
57 See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 475.25(b) (2013) (listing the following criteria: “1) 
Sentence, including factors such as the nature and class of the offense, length of sentence, 
and sentencing orders. 2) History of violence, abuse, criminal neglect, sexual offenses, or 
crimes against children. 3) Outstanding warrants or detainers. 4) Court order prohibiting 
contact with children. 5) Department of Children and Family Services involvement, 
including, but not limited to, present or past investigations or cases regarding the offender 
and her children. 6) Affiliation with organized crime activities or narcotics trafficking. 7) 
Mandatory supervised release date. 8) Grade, security designation, and escape risk. 9) 
Disciplinary history. 10) Psychological evaluation. 11) Medical or dental health. 12) 
Known enemies or documented offenders from whom the offender is to be kept separate.”). 
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day care facility.58 In addition to having superior living arrangements, participants 
are relieved from work for weeks after giving birth.59 But then they must resume 
normal prison life, going to work and attending classes, and they must arrange for 
other prisoners to care for their children during that time.60 Mothers are subject to 
eviction from the program if they violate any disciplinary rule, program policy, or 
staff command, which results in the baby’s immediate and permanent removal 
from the prison and thus the baby’s separation from the mother.61  
 
C.  Background Legal Rules for Parentage and Custody 
 
To understand how young children end up living in prisons requires 
familiarity with certain background legal rules for parentage and handling of 
prison births. State laws confer legal parent status on every child’s birth mother.62 
There is no basis for denying initial legal parent status to her; in particular, there is 
no exclusion based on unfitness or incapacity. The state can remove legal parent 
status from someone unwilling or unable to care for an offspring under laws 
authorizing termination of parental rights (TPR). That almost never happens, 
however, as a result of parental incarceration per se63 because typically, in most 
states, child welfare agencies are not involved when a child is born to a woman 
already in prison.64 Instead, absent a nursery program, the baby’s father or, more 
commonly, some other family member designated by the mother simply takes the 
baby from the prison or birthing facility.65 The baby then lives in temporary kin 
care, subject to reclamation by the mother upon her release.66  
                                                     
58 See Huey Freeman, Illinois Prison Program Guides New Mothers, 
PANTAGRAPH.COM (Apr. 12, 2010, 7:47 AM), http://www.pantagraph.com/news/state-and- 
regional/illinois/article_ab1d5106-4631-11df-97d4-001cc4c002e0.html. 
59 Id. 
60 ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 475.20(f)(2) (2013). 
61 Id. at § 475.35; see also NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 40, at 5 
(“Involuntary expulsion from the program may result from . . . [d]isregard for rules 
established in the Nursery Program/Unit or staff directives.”). 
62 See, e.g., 750 ILCS 45/4(1); Ohio R.C. § 3111.02. 
63 See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued 
Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 445–46, 447, 
452–60, 463–64 (2008). 
64 Cf. LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN, WHAT TO PLAN FOR WHEN 
YOU ARE PREGNANT AT THE CALIFORNIA INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN 12 (2013), available at 
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CIW-pregnancy-manua 
l-v.-3-6-13.pdf (instructing pregnant inmates that CPS will become involved after the birth 
only if no family member shows up at the hospital to take the baby or if the hospital 
happens to know the mother is already under CPS investigation or supervision and contacts 
CPS); Moses, supra note 18, at 1 (reporting that children are rarely placed in foster care as 
a result of maternal incarceration). 
65 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 551.24(b) (2012) (“Child placement is the inmate’s 
responsibility.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-714 (2011 & Supp. 2013) (“The child shall be 
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Only in the rare instance that no family member wishes to take the baby does 
CPS assume custody,67 and then the child lives in a foster home until the mother 
leaves prison or until CPS orchestrates a TPR and adoption.68 Federal law requires 
that CPS initiate a TPR proceeding if a child has been in nonrelative foster care for 
fifteen of the past twenty-two months (the “15/22 rule”), so the rare newborn who 
goes into foster care because of maternal incarceration is likely to remain in that 
impermanent status for at least a couple of years (fifteen months plus time for the 
TPR and adoption processes to run) if the birth mother has a long sentence.69 
Several states authorize TPR as to a child in state custody based solely on 
incarceration for a particular length of time, including at least two of the states 
currently operating prison nurseries.70 But that can only occur after CPS takes 
                                                     
removed from the state facility . . . and shall be delivered to his father or other member of 
his family.”); REPORT CARD, supra note 44, at 12 (noting that in one-fourth of cases, the 
father assumes custody). 
66 See, e.g., In re M.B., Nos. 11CA010060, 11CA010062, 2012 WL 5899320, ¶3 
(Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. Nov. 26, 2012) (“[A]fter Mother’s release from prison, she 
regained legal custody of S.Z.”); Compton v. Eckman, No. 11 MA 94, 2012 WL 1116931, 
¶¶51–52 (Ohio App. 7th Dist. Mar. 30, 2012) (ordering transfer of custody from father to 
mother after latter’s release from prison, despite mother’s extensive history of drug abuse). 
67 See supra note 20. 
68 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-714 (“If he is unable to effect the child’s removal 
[to a family member] . . . the director of the state facility shall cause the filing of a petition 
in the juvenile and domestic relations district court . . . requesting adjudication of the care 
and custody of the child . . . .”). 
69 See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 435–61 (describing federal law and agency resistance 
to its application). Ohio goes further and requires a petition for TPR after twelve months of 
foster care within a twenty-two month period. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.413 
(LexisNexis 2011). 
70 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.806(1)(d)(1) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013) 
(terminating parental rights when a parent is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional 
institution for a period that is expected to be a “substantial portion of the period of time 
before the child will attain the age of 18 years”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(r) 
(2009 & West Supp. 2013) (authorizing TPR based on a prison sentence of over two years 
if the child is in state custody, but only if “prior to incarceration the parent had little or no 
contact with the child or provided little or no support for the child.”); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2151.414(E)(12) (West 2005) (authorizing TPR if the parent is incarcerated and 
“will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months”); id. 
§ 2151.414(E)(5), (13) (authorizing TPR based on incarceration if the imprisonment is the 
result of conviction for “an offense committed against the child or a sibling of the child” or 
if “[t]he parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated incarceration prevents the 
parent from providing care for the child.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-26.1(4) (2004 & 
Supp. 2013) (authorizing TPR as to a parent who “[i]s incarcerated and is unavailable to 
care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority, considering the child’s 
age and the child’s need for care by an adult”). A court would probably say this does not 
include a woman who just gave birth to the child in question. Wyoming’s TPR statute 
includes a provision relating to incarceration that suggests something more is required, but 
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custody and only if CPS is motivated to move quickly for termination, which it 
generally is not.71 
Thus, the prevailing default rule and practice with newborns whose mothers 
are in prison has not been a child-welfare-agency or court determination of what is 
the best long-term family placement for them, but rather state empowerment of 
incarcerated mothers to choose who will take possession of the children. One 
might expect, given that these mothers typically want to be able to collect the child 
as soon as they leave prison, that they will choose someone who does not wish to 
be a permanent caretaker for the child. A large literature has documented the 
adverse outcomes for children in this situation, most of whom are left in poor and 
dangerous communities, passed from one overburdened custodian to another and 
living under the cloud of having a “real” parent who is an incarcerated criminal.72 
These children are at very high risk for mental health problems, substance abuse, 
unintended pregnancy, dropping out of school, gang involvement, chronic 
unemployment, and incarceration as adults.73 The intergenerational cycle is clear.74 
                                                     
it is unclear what. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(a)(iv) (2013) (authorizing TPR when 
“[t]he parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent 
is unfit to have the custody and control of the child”). 
71 See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 452–57. 
72 See infra note 73. Some developmental experts believe, however, that the main 
cause of the problems these children manifest is actually the life they had with their 
mothers before the mothers went to prison. See, e.g., Joseph Murray & Lynne Murray, 
Parental Incarceration, Attachment and Child Psychopathology, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUM. 
DEV. 289, 303 (2010) (“Given the extreme disadvantage that many children experience 
before parental incarceration, it seems unlikely that parental incarceration is the main cause 
of psychopathology in this population.”). 
73 See e.g., PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED, supra note 72, at 1–2 (“[F]amilies impacted 
by incarceration are already typically at high risk along several dimensions. . . . The 
incarceration of a family member may further exacerbate an environment already 
characterized by ongoing poverty, stress, or trauma.”); JANE A. SIEGEL, DISRUPTED 
CHILDHOODS: CHILDREN OF WOMEN IN PRISON 5–8 (2011) (describing the challenges and 
consequences faced by children with parents who are incarcerated); Murray & Murray, 
supra note 72, at 303 (“Parental incarceration is a strong predictor of certain symptoms of 
child psychopathology.”). See also generally NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE 
WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED (2005) (proposing that reform of our criminal 
justice system be viewed through the eyes of children whose families are disrupted by 
incarceration); DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND 
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (discussing how criminal sanctions shape the 
lives of criminal offenders’ children); CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS: A 
HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCHERS AND PRACTITIONERS (J. Mark Eddy & Julie Poehlmann 
eds., 2010) (summarizing “current research on children whose parents are incarcerated and 
discuss[ing] the implications of those findings for policy and intervention”); CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS: THEORETICAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND CLINICAL ISSUES (Yvette 
R. Harris et al. eds., 2010) (providing “psychologists, educators, students, researchers, and 
policy makers who work with . . . or pursue research on children of incarcerated parents, as 
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Evidence from developmental studies suggests the psycho-emotional root of the 
problems is the children’s failure to form secure attachments to a permanent 
caregiver, resulting from the chaotic life they had with their mothers before their 
mothers’ arrests and/or from “unstable caregiving situations during the mothers’ 
incarceration.”75 
To the extent support for children-in-prison programs has rested on any child 
welfare motivation, that support has been a reaction to this tragic reality produced 
by the default regime. But the option of placing children in confinement with their 
mothers is the only alternative that receives attention. No laws direct prison 
officials to encourage mothers to consider relinquishing a baby for adoption, let 
alone trigger CPS or court consideration of adoption for the baby, and there is no 
evidence that any prison officials or social workers on their own initiative urge 
pregnant inmates to consider adoption. They would likely incur recrimination from 
women’s advocacy organizations if they did so.  
In any event, prison nursery programs will likely foreclose the possibility of 
adoption. Women facing a year or more of incarceration who are offered the 
opportunity to move to a nicer unit and live with the baby they just delivered are 
exceedingly unlikely to decline that opportunity. Moreover, if any female convicts 
do contemplate acting altruistically by choosing adoption, to give their babies the 
best chance for a happy and fulfilling life, the tremendous push that self-appointed 
advocates for women prisoners are now making for children-in-prison programs 
suggests that these women would be under tremendous pressure to hold on to their 
offspring. They would be pushed to insist on occupying the role of legal mother—
despite any concerns they have about subjecting their babies to the prison 
environment and later to the dangers of the communities they came from, despite 
the personal struggles that led to their incarceration and that will continue to pose 
severe challenges for them after release, and despite the ready availability of good 
adoptive homes.76 
                                                     
well as the frontline responders who provide immediate assistance to these children” with a 
“comprehensive source”). 
74 See Nekima Levy-Pounds, From the Frying Pan into the Fire: How Poor Women 
of Color and Children Are Affected by Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums, 
47 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 285, 301–02 (2007) (stating that increased rate of imprisonment 
has “ensured the entrapment of African-American women and their children in a continual 
cycle of poverty and marginalization from mainstream society” and that “punitive 
measures often fail to address the underlying issues of drug addiction, incarceration, and 
poverty, essentially paving the way for future generations to suffer a similar fate”). Pfaff, 
supra note 5, at 1107 (“incarceration can be a self-sustaining ‘epidemic’”). 
75 Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 292–97, 303. 
76 See JO JONES, ADOPTION EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN AND DEMAND FOR 
CHILDREN TO ADOPT BY WOMEN 18–44 YEARS OF AGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2002, at 
12, 22, 25 tbl.7 (VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS Ser. 23, Nov. 27, 2008) (showing 900,000 
women currently seeking to adopt, most of them married, including 228,000 black women 
and 195,000 Hispanic women); id. at 16, 33 tbl.15 (showing that over half of these women 
express indifference about the race of the child, only one-fifth of white women seeking to 
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III.  IDEALS AND REALITIES OF CHILDREN-IN-PRISON PROGRAMS 
 
The extraordinary push in recent years to increase children’s presence in 
prisons has not come from child welfare organizations. Rather, the force behind 
these programs has been individuals and organizations that advocate for prisoners, 
women, the poor, or racial minorities in general.77 These advocates generally 
ignore evidence showing that bringing children into prison is contrary to the 
children’s welfare, ignore or dismiss the option of adoption, and make unsupported 
claims about the positive impacts of these alternative programs.78 
                                                     
adopt express a preference for a white child, half express a preference for a child less than 
two-years old, and 89% would accept a child with a mild disability); id. at 16 (“[I]n 
2002 . . . the domestic supply of infants relinquished at birth or within the first month of 
life and available to be adopted had become virtually nonexistent.”); Jeff Katz, Adoption’s 
Numbers Mystery, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2008, at A17 (“a government agency has found 
that there are far more women seeking to adopt children than there are children awaiting 
adoption.”).  
77 See, e.g., Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 275 (“Feminist criminologists have led 
the call for increased gender-responsiveness in correctional facilities. . . . Prison nursery 
programs and community-based co-residence facilities are the primary intervention 
strategies currently implemented specifically for women under criminal justice supervision 
and their infant children.”). 
78 See, e.g., Noelle E. Fearn & Kelly Parker, Washington State’s Residential 
Parenting Program: An Integrated Public Health, Education, and Social Service Resource 
for Pregnant Inmates and Prison Mothers, 2 CAL. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 34, 44 (2004) 
(promoting prison nurseries because of “the lack of sufficient placement alternatives” for 
the children of the incarcerated women. “The alternative to care from their mothers—such 
as placement with grandparents (53%), other relatives (26%), or foster care (10%)—can 
come at a great expense to these children and their wellbeing.”); Michal Gilad & Tal Gat, 
U.S. v. My Mommy: Evaluation of Prison Nurseries as a Solution for Children of 
Incarcerated Women, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371, 383 (2013) (dismissing the 
option of adoption by suggesting adoptive homes are not available to newborns who are 
black, but citing in support a publication discussing adoptions of older children out of the 
foster care system); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 286–88 (devoting over two pages to 
the topic: “Policy Alternatives to Prison Nurseries,” but never mentioning adoption); 
Kennedy, supra note 18, at 197–200 (opposing TPR of incarcerated mothers); Nicole S. 
Mauskopf, Reaching Beyond the Bars: An Analysis of Prison Nurseries, 5 CARDOZO 
WOMEN’S L.J. 101, 112–15 (dismissing adoption as alternative by citing parents’ 
constitutional rights); Myrna S. Raeder, Special Issue: Making a Better World for Children 
of Incarcerated Parents, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 23, 27 (2012) (dismissing adoption with the 
suggestion that children of all ages are difficult to place and psychologically bonded to 
extended family); Vainik, supra note 12, at 683 (considering placement with relatives and 
foster care as the only alternatives to housing children in prison with their mothers); 
Allison Ford, Bonding Behind Bars: Do Prison Nurseries Help or Hinder Parenting?, 
DIVINE CAROLINE, http://www.divinecaroline.com/life-etc/culture-causes/bonding-behind- 
bars-do-prison-nurseries-help-or-hinder-parenting (last visited Apr. 2, 2014) (“[G]rowing 
up on lockdown isn’t the ideal situation for any child. But since the alternative is that kids 
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A.  The Ideals 
 
The primary motivation for state actors to accede to advocates’ requests for 
more programs that bring children into prisons has been the law-and-order and 
fiscal aims of preventing criminals from reoffending after they are released from 
prison.79 Most private advocates for children-in-prison programs primarily 
manifest sympathy for prison inmates,80 though they also typically assert that the 
programs reduce recidivism.81 Legal scholarship on the topic is almost entirely 
                                                     
often bounce between foster families or the homes of distant relatives . . . living in a stable 
prison environment with their mothers make it a far preferable scenario.”). See also infra 
notes 185–191 and 199–253 and accompanying text (discussing unsupported claims 
regarding the effect of programs on recidivism and children’s attachment). 
79 See, e.g., S.B. 491, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1998); REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 12, 
13, 30; Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 377–78 (“Recidivism, one aspect of maternal 
rehabilitation, has been the most commonly used measure of prison nursery program 
success. Relationship factors have received no empirical attention until the present 
study.”); Carlson, supra note 47, at 17 (“[M]ost [prison nursery programs] have the hope of 
reducing the inmate mother’s risk of recidivism . . . .”); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 
273 (“[L]awmakers are providing bi-partisan support for services to incarcerated and 
recently released populations, particularly those programs designed to decrease 
recidivism.”); Fiorica, supra note 28, at 58 (“Strong family ties can help with rehabilitation 
if those bonds remain intact.”); Freeman, supra note 58 (“Prison officials are constantly 
frustrated by a revolving door, the seemingly endless supply of inmates returning shortly 
after they are released.”); Vainik, supra note 12, at 683; Erin Jordan, Prison Nurseries Cut 
Female Inmates’ Risk of Reoffending, GAZETTE (Cedar Rapids) (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:52 AM), 
http://thegazette.com/2011/01/31/prison-nurseries-cut-female-inmates-risk-of-reoffending/ 
(“Prison nurseries are gaining ground because of evidence they reduce recidivism, which 
saves the cost of housing repeat offenders.”).  
80 See Fearn & Parker, supra note 78, at 45 (noting pregnant inmates’ fear of their 
children being placed in foster care and urging expansion of baby-in-prison programs 
because “[p]rison nurseries may well serve those women for whom, for whatever reason, 
incarceration is an appropriate punishment.”); Vicki Haddock, Babies Behind Bars: With 
California Inmates Expected to Give Birth to More than 300 Babies This Year, Officials 
Are Preparing to Open the State’s First Prison Nursery, SFGATE.COM, May 14, 2006, 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/BABIES-BEHIND-BARS-With-California-inmates- 
2497061.php; see also Vainik, supra note 12, at 682–83 (suggesting three policies that will 
further “humane treatment of incarcerated women,” including prison nurseries). 
81 See, e.g., Alexander’s Testimony, supra note 19; SARAH DIAMOND & JASMINE 
ORWISH-GROSS, DIAMOND RESEARCH CONSULTING LLC, PRISON NURSERY PROGRAMS: 
POLICY BRIEF FOR CT 1 (2012), available at http://www.diamondresearchconsulting.com/1 
74-2/ (citing “the urgent need to lower recidivism rates” in encouraging Connecticut 
legislators to approve a prison nursery bill); REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 12, 13, 30; 
Carlson, supra note 47, at 17–18; Gilad & Gat, supra note 78, at 388 (“There is strong 
empirical evidence to support the claim that PNPs can lower rates of recidivism.”); Vainik, 
supra note 12, at 682–83; Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 164; VILLANUEVA supra note 1, at 
16–17; Haverty, supra note 52 (“[P]articipating in prison nurseries lowers recidivism rates 
dramatically . . . .”); Press Release, Women’s Prison Ass’n, New Report: Prison Nursery 
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feminist writing, sympathetic to any policies promising to alleviate the perceived 
suffering of incarcerated women.82 This is part of a broader scholarly concern for 
incarcerated women, reflected in a large literature characterizing them as victims 
of economic injustice and male oppression. This concern also underlies, and calls 
for, substantial changes in criminal sentencing, improved societal support for 
single mothers and victims of domestic violence, and comprehensive programs to 
help incarcerated mothers chart a new course in life.83 Though that concern is 
commendable and that characterization quite plausible, sympathy for the women 
appears to blind advocates to the reality of the babies’ needs and the potential 
conflict of interests between mothers and their children. Many who advocate 
bringing children into prisons blithely assert that it will benefit the children by 
enabling them to form a secure attachment to their birth mother—a crucial aspect 
of healthy child development that I discuss below.84 This might be important to 
some because they care about children and to others because of the well-known 
phenomenon of children following their parents’ criminal path, the “cradle to 
prison pipeline.”85 But the programs have arisen without any empirical support for 
                                                     
Programs a Growing Trend in Women’s Prisons (July 13, 2009) (on file with Utah Law 
Review) (quoting a policy associate at the Women’s Prison Association as saying “the 
research shows that these programs produce lower rates of recidivism among participating 
mothers”).  
82 See e.g., Kennedy, supra note 18, at 166 (characterizing separation of convicted 
mothers from their children as a “call to action for feminists interested in dismantling 
stereotypes about women, mothering, race, and poverty”); Vainik, supra note 12, at 680–
81, 683 (arguing, based on women’s rights, for more programs in which children live with 
convicted mothers and other reforms that benefit incarcerated mothers). 
83 See generally, e.g., BARBARA BLOOM ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., GENDER-
RESPONSIVE STRATEGIES: RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR WOMEN 
OFFENDERS (2003); INTERRUPTED LIFE: EXPERIENCES OF INCARCERATED WOMEN IN THE 
UNITED STATES (Rickie Solinger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INTERRUPTED LIFE]; JODY 
RAPHAEL, FREEING TAMMY: WOMEN, DRUGS, AND INCARCERATION (2007); PAULA C. 
JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON (2003); 
MADONNA R. MAIDMENT, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: DECONSTRUCTING THE 
BENEVOLENT COMMUNITY (2006); Sally Day, Mothers in Prison: How the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act of 1997 Threatens Parental Rights, 20 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 217 (2005); 
Marie A. Failinger, Lessons Unlearned: Women Offenders, the Ethics of Care, and the 
Promise of Restorative Justice, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 487 (2006); George, supra note 8; 
see also Levy-Pounds, supra note 74, at 301–02; Tiffany Scott, Repercussions of the 
“Crack Baby” Epidemic: Why a Message of Care Rather than Punishment is Needed for 
Pregnant Drug-Users, 19 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 203, 216 (2006). 
84 See, e.g., REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 30.  
85 See Susan Phillips, Mother-Child Programs: Connecting Child Welfare and 
Corrections Agencies, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 22-2 (“Another reason for 
the growing interest in programs of this nature is their potential for preventing children 
whose mothers are incarcerated from following in their mothers’ footsteps.”). 
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this assertion regarding children’s welfare,86 which makes it appear disingenuous, 
or, at best, as wishful thinking. As discussed below, the first study of attachment 
outcomes for prison nursery babies in the U.S. was published in 2010, even though 
the Bedford Hills prison nursery has existed for over a century.87 The only studies 
of child welfare impact available to the seven states that created prison nurseries in 
the fifteen years before 2010, therefore, would have been a 1980s study of child 
development in United Kingdom prison nurseries—which found “progressive 
developmental decline in motor and cognitive scores . . . for all nursery infants 
after admission to the unit”88—and two observational studies of the Bedford Hills 
program in the early 1990s that found physical and cognitive developmental delays 
in a large percentage of the children.89 Moreover, this unsupported child welfare 
speculation typically operates against a background assumption that the only 
alternative for a child is the current default regime of “bouncing around” among 
relatives or spending childhood in foster care.90 But that is clearly false, given that 
the number of Americans wishing to adopt an infant far exceeds the number of 
infants currently available for adoption,91 as well as the fact that children adopted 
soon after birth have developmental outcomes as good as or better than the general 
population and far better than children raised in the types of homes and 
communities from which most incarcerated women come.92 Adoption could also 
                                                     
86 Cf. Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 276 (“Data regarding child-specific 
outcomes . . . have rarely been collected.”); id. at 277 (“Research assessing US outcomes 
other than recidivism is nascent.”); Pojman, supra note 29, at 61 (“[R]esearch specifically 
measuring the long-term impact of nurseries on children is virtually non-existent . . . .”). 
87 See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 377–78, 386; Flowers, supra note 46 (“Prior to 
Byrne’s research, no one had formally studied the impact of the prison nursery on an 
infant’s development.”). 
88 Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 277. 
89 See Pojman, supra note 29, at 65–66. These reports do not appear to be available 
anymore, which might mean the American Medical Association withdrew them, perhaps 
because of flaws, but they were available to policy makers at least as recently as 2001. Id. 
at 51 n.41. 
90 See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 793, 868–74 (2011) (considering several ways to avoid separating parents from 
children, but not adoption); Bill Hewitt & Margaret Nelson, Mothers Behind Bars, PEOPLE, 
Nov. 11, 1996, at 95 (reporting an interview with a Nebraska prison warden who stated that 
prison nurseries are less expensive than placing a child in foster care); Vainik, supra note 
12, at 683–84 (stating that although putting babies in prison “might not be the optimal 
scenario,” it is better than placing children in foster care or with relatives). 
91 See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 428–35 (“children are readily adoptable immediately 
after birth, but their chances for adoption diminish steadily from that point on . . . .”). 
92 See SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ADOPTION USA: A CHARTBOOK BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE 
PARENTS 7 (2009) (stating that most children privately adopted were under one month of 
age at time of placement); id at 21–35 (providing comparative statistics for all children in 
the United States versus privately adopted children with respect to physical health, social 
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allow a child to begin life with two parents in a loving, mutually supportive 
relationship with each other, rather than with a single parent.93 Encouraging these 
women to relinquish their babies for adoption, or terminating their rights 
involuntarily and immediately to clear the way for adoption,94 would, as shown 
further below, give these babies a far better chance at a good upbringing with 
permanent, stable, capable caregivers. But prison nursery advocates never consider 
these possibilities. 
In any case, the ideal depicted by advocates for prison nurseries, and the 
expectation of legislators and prison officials who approve them, is this: The state 
will place newborns into prison with the birth mothers. As a consequence of this 
close and supervised contact, the children will form a secure attachment to their 
mothers. The children will then leave the prison with their mothers. The mothers 
will thereafter refrain from criminal conduct (including substance abuse) and will 
remain the custodians of the children throughout their minority, consistently 
providing safe, stable, and suitable home for the children. 
 
 
 
                                                     
and emotional well-being, and relationship with parents); id at 46 (showing 41% of private 
adoptions were by relatives, which likely skews well-being statistics downward for this 
group of children); Elizabeth Bartholet, Creating a Child-Friendly Child Welfare System: 
Effective Early Intervention to Prevent Maltreatment and Protect Victimized Children, 60 
BUFF. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (2012) (noting that “the adoptive parent maltreatment rate is 
lower than the norm for the general population”); Dwyer, supra note 63, at 434 (noting the 
predominance of substance abuse, mental illness, and criminal records among parents 
whose children suffer maltreatment and developmental problems); Jacqueline Y. Portello, 
The Mother-Infant Attachment Process in Adoptive Families, 27 CANADIAN J. COUNSELING 
177, 178–79 (1993) (summarizing studies finding no difference in attachment results as 
between children raised by biological parents and children placed with adoptive parents in 
the first six months of life). 
93 On the traditional preference adoption agencies give to married applicants and the 
child welfare benefits of two-parent households, see generally Lynn D. Wardle, Preference 
for Marital Couple Adoption—Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 
345 (2003); Who Can Adopt?, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/who-can-a 
dopt-child-30291.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) (“Agencies often ‘reserve’ healthy infants 
and younger children for two-parent families”). 
94 In some states, statutory amendment might be necessary to accomplish an 
immediate TPR based on incarceration per se. In others, it is already possible. See, e.g., 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.414(E)(12)–(13) (authorizing TPR based on a prison sentence 
of greater than eighteen months or on repeated incarceration); S.D. Codified Laws § 26-
8A-26.1 (authorizing TPR based on a finding that a parent is “incarcerated and is 
unavailable to care for the child during a significant period of the child’s minority, 
considering the child’s age and the child’s need for care by an adult”). In addition, in every 
state other circumstances in the lives of incarcerated women can serve as a legal basis for 
immediate TPR, such as a prior TPR as to another child. See Dwyer, supra note 63, at 438. 
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B.  The Realities 
 
Without knowing much about the programs or studies on the effects of 
bringing children into prisons, one might suppose there are good and bad aspects 
for children. While in prison, they get more time with their biological mothers, and 
the parents might be more attentive than they would be at home. On the other 
hand, prisons are typically unhappy, stressful, and dangerous places where most 
nonincarcerated parents would likely never bring their own children for any 
reason. 
 
1.  Mothers’ Incapacity 
 
As to the positive dimension of children being with their birth mothers rather 
than in the care of someone who is not in prison, one must bear in mind that 
incarcerated women are generally not well functioning, psychologically healthy 
people who happen to land in prison one day because of aberrational misconduct.95 
To the contrary, the great majority of these women suffer from deep, serious 
mental health problems and addictions and have been involved in criminal activity 
for a long time.96 Most had very poor upbringings themselves—a large portion 
having suffered from physical or sexual abuse as children—and never developed a 
secure attachment to their own parents.97 Dysfunction typically runs through the 
                                                     
95 The frequent claim that a large portion of the prison population consists of people 
who committed minor drug offenses is false. See Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and 
Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 175 (2013) (“[G]iven the consensual nature of 
drug crimes, they are underreported and police choose to apprehend only about 10% of 
drug users.”); Pfaff, supra note 5, at 1096 (“Relatively few drug arrests result in 
incarceration . . . .”).  
96 See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379 (finding a history of substance abuse in most 
women in the New York prison nursery programs); Jude Cassidy et al., Enhancing 
Attachment Security in the Infants of Women in a Jail-Diversion Program, 12 
ATTACHMENT & HUM. DEV. 333, 334 (2010) (noting “65 to 94% of pregnant inmates 
report histories of substance abuse” and “the majority of pregnant inmates report 
depressive symptomatology at levels indicative of clinical depression”); Lili Garfinkel, 
Female Offenders and Disabilities, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 39-1, 39-3 
(“[T]he typical female offender had been hospitalized at least once for a psychiatric 
episode (usually a suicide attempt), had been violent in a school setting, and had a 
diagnosis of ODD (oppositional-defiant disorder). Because of girls’ histories of abuse and 
violence it is likely that they also have abuse-related disorders such as PTSD.”); Diane S. 
Yough & Liete C. Dennis, The Complex Needs of Mentally Ill Women in County Jails, in 
WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 42-1, 42-2 to 42-3 (noting that the “vast majority . . . 
had previously been in psychiatric and/or alcohol or drug treatment” and “[t]wo-thirds . . . 
had received psychiatric medication in the past”). 
97 See REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 9 (“Rather than being treated for trauma, 
depression, addiction, and the other indelible injuries of violence, these mothers have been 
displaced into the criminal justice system.”); Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 386 (“[M]any 
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families of incarcerated women; for example, most of these women have parents or 
siblings who have been incarcerated,98 and nearly half had parents who abused 
alcohol or drugs.99 Many grew up in foster care.100 When sentenced to prison, two-
thirds had prior convictions,101 and most were abusing drugs.102 Furthermore, 
victims of domestic violence comprise a large percentage of female inmates,103 and 
one-third of incarcerated women have been raped before entering prison.104 One 
inmate, in the documentary film Mothers of Bedford Hills, stated, “[W]e’re all sick 
and broken when we enter these gates, or we wouldn’t be here.”105 Having 
sympathy for and desire to improve life for these women is entirely understandable 
and commendable. Unfortunately, this sickness and brokenness prevents adequate 
parenting106—in fact, more than a third of incarcerated women who were already 
mothers were not living with their children at the time of their arrest.107 
Imprisonment temporarily removes these women from the home environment 
that produced their dysfunctions, and it mostly curtails their substance abuse. It 
                                                     
of the women in our sample did have mental health needs including depressive 
symptomatology.”); id at 381–82 (finding that among thirty maternal research subjects only 
one-third had attached securely to their own parents in childhood); Cassidy et al., supra 
note 96, at 334 (reporting that 60% of pregnant inmates “experienced family violence 
during childhood” and “24% reported experiencing sexual abuse before adulthood”); 
Failinger, supra note 83, at 501 (noting “highly disproportionate incidence of childhood 
physical, sexual, and emotional abuse that is found among female offenders”); Makariev & 
Shaver, supra note 11, at 312, 318; Malika Saada Saar, Mothers Behind Bars in the United 
States: A Human Rights Issue, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.huffingtonp 
ost.com/malika-saada-saar/a-report-card-on-mothers-_b_774338.html (“The shared narra-
tive arc of incarcerated women and mothers behind bars is that of repeated experiences of 
brutal sexual and physical victimization, generally begun during girlhood.”). 
98 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 7. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 22; Murray & Murray, supra note 70, at 300 (noting that 46% had a prior or 
current conviction for a violent offense). 
102 Id. 
103 Failinger, supra note 83, at 493–94 (“[W]omen’s . . . relationships with men in 
their lives, profoundly affects the behavior that lands them in the criminal justice system. 
Covington has described how dysfunction in women offenders’ relationship leads to drug 
abuse and other crime.”); Michelle S. Jacobs, Piercing the Prison Uniform of Invisibility 
for Black Female Inmates, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 804–11 (2004). 
104 See Alysia Santo, Raped Behind Bars: New York Prisons Have A Problem: A Fox 
Guarding the Henhouse, TIMESUNION.COM, (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:39 AM), http://www.timesun 
ion.com/local/article/Raped-behind-bars-4795883.php. 
105 MOTHERS OF BEDFORD HILLS (Covey Productions Apr. 2011).  
106 See Byrne et al., supra note 47, at 27 (“[I]mprisoned pregnant women are, not 
unexpectedly, poor candidates for bonding and attachment with their infants.”); Cassidy et 
al., supra note 96, at 334 (“The multiple psychosocial problems presented by pregnant 
inmates have been well-established as risk factors for poor parenting.”). 
107 Id. at 30. 
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does not, however, cure them of deep-seated problems nor alter the environment to 
which they are likely to return after release.108 To the contrary, “[w]omen go to 
prison often with an already severe complex of problems, which, without adequate 
treatment, the harsh conditions of prison tend to exacerbate.”109 Imprisonment adds 
stressors of its own that intensify psychopathologies.110 Human rights 
organizations complain that prison life today remains “harsh and dehumanizing for 
all who are confined.”111 The physical environment in prisons is generally stifling, 
harsh, unstimulating, and foreboding.112 The social environment is rife with 
hostility, fear, and depression.113 The prison setting denies women autonomy and 
                                                     
108 See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 21 (“Most correctional interventions do not 
address the effects of early physical, sexual, and emotional abuse and the resulting 
trauma.”); Gina McGalliard, Record Numbers of Incarcerated Mothers Bad News for 
Women, Children, and Communities, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 27, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://truth-out. 
org/news/item/5871-record-numbers-of-incarcerated…rs-bad-news-for-women-children-co 
mmunities?tmpl=component&print=1 (quoting the Executive Director of the Women’s 
Prison Association, Georgia Lerner, who said that “going to prison fails to address the 
underlying factors that led to incarceration in the first place”). Many advocates for 
incarcerated women bemoan the lack of adequate medical care, mental health treatment, 
counseling, and drug rehabilitation. See, e.g., REPORT CARD, supra note 4; Vainik, supra 
note 12, at 676–77. 
109 Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 142; id. at 145 (“Women come into prison with a 
lifetime of unmet needs in health care, education, and vocational training. The experience 
of incarceration exacerbates these issues in potentially dangerous ways . . . .”); Baradon et 
al., New Beginnings—An Experience-Based Programme Addressing the Attachment 
Relationship Between Mothers and their Babies in Prisons, 34 J. CHILD PSYCHOTHERAPY 
240, 242 (2008) (“We assume that many troubling aspects of the mothers’ histories are 
activated by the prison environment, thereby creating major problems for the establishment 
of caregiving bonds.”). 
110 See John J. Gibbs, Symptoms of Psychopathology Among Jail Prisoners: The 
Effects of Exposure to the Jail Environment, 14 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 288, 307 (1987) 
(suggesting “going to jail can substantially increase the severity of some symptoms of 
psychopathy”); Ruthanne DeWolfe & Alan S. DeWolfe, Impact of Prison Conditions on 
the Mental Health of Inmates, 4 S. ILL. U. L.J. 497, 533 (1979) (discussing the negative 
effects maximum security prison systems have on the psychological health of inmates and 
proposing solutions to this problem). 
111 See Saar, supra note 97. 
112 See, e.g., Bailey v. Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 654 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 
1979) (stating as a factor in assessing the child’s welfare interests “the effect that 
institutionalization would have on the child after the first few months, considering the 
constriction on movement and the sterility of environment”); id. at 656 (characterizing the 
prison as “an unsuitable environment” for a child). 
113 See Christina Jose-Kampfner, Coming to Terms with Existential Death: An 
Analysis of Women’s Adaptation to Life in Prison, 17 SOC. JUST. 110, 115−19 (1990) 
(discussing the emotional experiences of women serving long prison sentences and 
comparing those experiences to the terminally ill); La Rosa, supra note 29, at 2−3 
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privacy, as they are constantly under the authoritarian control of prison guards and 
surrounded by people who also committed crimes and have deep-seated 
psychological problems.114 Inmate-on-inmate sexual violence is actually four times 
higher in female prisons than in male prisons.115  
Living in a nursery unit is certainly more comfortable for inmates, but it is 
still life in a prison (in fact, the women typically spend much of their day outside 
the nursery unit amidst the general population116), and it can entail different 
stressors. For example, other prisoners are likely to resent women who receive 
special treatment because of their children, and prison nurseries entail the 
additional tension arising from babies’ uncontrolled noise, especially during the 
night.117 Many incarcerated women, both those in nursery units and those in 
normal units, describe prison life as socially and emotionally isolating, entailing 
complete severance of ties with family and friends and conditions not conducive to 
forming positive new ties, which compounds their struggles with depression, guilt, 
                                                     
(discussing various arguments for why incarcerated mothers should not be allowed to raise 
their newborn children in prison). 
114 See, e.g., Amy Littlefield, Mothers Behind Bars: The Prison Birth Project Helps 
Women in Prison with Pregnancy, Delivery and Parenting, VALLEY ADVOCATE (June 24, 
2010) (relating inmate’s description of “[t]he structure of life in the jail—the strip searches, 
the uniformed guards, the heavily controlled schedule, the medications used to sedate her—
made [the inmate] feel stripped of her right to be an emotional person. ‘It’s really 
humiliating having to face the guards that watch you strip every day . . . . You don’t have 
that personal, private thing anymore. . . . You have nothing. You are a number . . . . You 
have no right to feel, no emotions, no opinions, you have nothing. You do and say what 
you’re told to do. That’s it.”’). 
115 See ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2011–
2012, at 17−18 (2013).  
116 See Fiorica, supra note 28, at 58; see also supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
117 See, e.g., Bailey v. Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 656 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 
1979) (noting Sheriff’s concern that the effect of babies’ presence on other inmates could 
create a “security hazard”); Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (Sup. Ct. Tioga Cnty, 
1973) (“The Sheriff . . . complains that the jail morale will be lowered in that others so 
confined are not allowed to have their families in jail and that the child’s crying will disturb 
the other prisoners.”); La Rosa, supra note 29 (stating that a constant source of tension in 
nursery units comes from babies crying during the night).  
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and sense of loss.118 Many are preoccupied with thoughts of children and men left 
behind.119 
Prison guards use their power over female inmates to inflict psychological and 
sexual abuse.120 Rape of incarcerated females is a widespread problem in many 
states.121 Reporting rape or any other abuse typically results in the accuser’s being 
put in solitary confinement. That potential punishment, along with difficulty of 
proof, officials’ lack of sympathy for criminals, and a code of secrecy, give guards 
near impunity.122 A prison guard is not likely to become kind and nurturing just 
because an inmate has a baby with her.123  
A study of New York’s two prison nurseries found “crowded conditions and 
negative interactions with corrections officers and nursery staff. Mothers expressed 
strain related to parenting in a demanding environment in which they felt basic 
                                                     
118 See Jose-Kampfner, supra note 113, at 118−19; Quinn, supra note 28, at 2 (“As 
she struggles to mourn for her daughter in an atmosphere where she has no true friends 
among the other inmates, she believes she is not worthy of being a parent.”); see also Lorie 
S. Goshin & Mary W. Byrne, Predictors of Post-Release Research Retention and 
Subsequent Reenrollment for Women Recruited While Incarcerated, 35 RES. IN NURSING & 
HEALTH 94, 95 (2012) (“Social networks, frayed prior to criminal justice contact, can be 
further damaged by incarceration.”). 
119 See, e.g., Paul Vallely, Mothers & Prison: Babies Behind Bars, INDEPENDENT 
(U.K.) (Sept. 17, 2012), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ 
mothers--prison-babies-behind-bars-8143296.html. 
120 See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 25−26; Santo, supra note 104, at 1 
(describing pervasive problem of inmate abuse in New York State’s women’s prisons); 
Critical Statistics: California Women’s Prisons, CAL. COALITION FOR WOMAN PRISONERS, 
http://www.womenprisoners.org/resources/critical_statistics.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) 
(“It is in this powerless environment that some prisoners have endured sexual assault from 
guards.); id. (reporting that “71% of women in California prisons report experiencing 
continual physical abuse by guards or other prisoners”; “[p]ersistent privacy violations are 
a fact of life for women in California prisons”; “male guards observe female inmates at all 
times—while taking showers, dressing, going to the bathroom and being strip searched”; 
and prisoners endure “degrading and sexually explicit language and frequent harassment 
from guards” and risk retaliation from the guards if they report any such abuse). 
121 See Santo, supra note 104 (reporting the pervasive problem of sexual abuse in 
New York women’s prisons); Kelsey Meany, Former Inmates Claim Texas Prison Ran 
‘Rape Camp’, DAILY BEAST (June 20, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
witw/articles/2013/06/19/former-inmates-claim-texas-prison-ran-rape-camp.html. 
122 See Meany, supra note 121; Alysia Santo, Hidden World of Official Silence, TIMES 
UNION (Sept. 9, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/Hidden-world-o 
f-official-silence-4795871.php. 
123 Cf. REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 13 (“Reports from mothers with children in 
prison nurseries indicate that their babies’ close proximity allows prison staff to coerce and 
manipulate a mother by threatening to deny her access to her baby.”); Vainik, supra note 
12, at 681 (expressing concern about women’s powerlessness with prison guards and 
officials). 
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care giving, like feeding their infant, was tightly controlled.”124 In fact, guards 
have especially great power over the women in prison nurseries, because any 
report of misconduct or harm to a baby could get a mother immediately ejected 
from the program and separated from her baby.125 A woman at Bedford Hills 
confessed to concealing her son’s broken kneecap for some time because she knew 
reporting his fall out of a crib would result in his removal from the prison.126  
 
2.  Unhealthy Environment 
 
The same conditions that exacerbate inmates’ psychological and personality 
problems are also likely to affect children adversely, both directly—by exposing 
them to the same hostile and stifling atmosphere—and indirectly—by disturbing 
their caregivers. In most nursery programs, babies come into contact not just with 
other mother-child pairs but also with inmates who do not have a child with them 
in prison, either because these other inmates serve as day care workers or because 
the babies live in a unit that contains inmates who do not have children with 
them.127 Such contact with other inmates increases risk of harm and disease.128 In 
some prisons, inmates have access to drugs,129 and women in the nursery who 
know or suspect the guards are going to have them ejected are likely to act in a 
                                                     
124 Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 278 (citing Katherine Gabel & Kathryn Girard, 
Long-Term Care Nurseries in Prison: A Descriptive Study, in CHILDREN OF 
INCARCERATED PARENTS 237, 253 (Katherine Gabel & Denise Johnston eds., 1995); R. 
Barry Ruback & Timothy S. Carr, Crowding in a Woman’s Prison: Attitudinal and 
Behavioral Effects, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 57, 57−59 (1984) (discussing the adverse 
impact of crowded conditions, lack of privacy, and lack of control). 
125 See MAWHORR, supra note 43, at 7 (reporting study showing 15% of mothers in 
Ohio’s prison nursery were ejected for rule infraction or inattention to their babies); SHAIN 
ET AL., supra note 30, at 17 (discussing mothers’ fear of retaliation by guards for anything 
that displeases them, causing some to forego asking for medical attention for their sick or 
injured children); see also Baradon et al., supra note 109, at 242 (“[T]he officer-prisoner 
relationship may easily trigger a negative transference underpinned by unresolved conflicts 
within their own child-parent relationship.”). 
126 Tracy Murphy, Mom: Having Son in Prison Was Scary, Beautiful, HLN VIDEOS, 
http://www.hlntv.com/video/2013/06/03/babies-behind-bars (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
127 See Kauffman, supra note 52, at 20-5 (noting that different prisons have different 
conceptions of the role of the nursery in the wider prison community and that children are 
exposed to other “program mothers and the inmate caregivers”).  
128 See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 94 (noting a “higher prevalence of . . . 
mental illness, substance use disorders, hepatitis, HIV/AIDS, and other sexually 
transmitted infections” among incarcerated women). 
129 See, e.g., Laura Stone, Women Behind Bars: A Baby’s Home Behind the Barbed 
Wire, CALGARY HERALD (May 25, 2012) http://www.calgaryherald.com/news/alberta/Wo 
men+Behind+Bars+baby+home+behind+barbed+wire/5540938/story.html (citing prison 
employees’ position that “drugs proliferate” in the prison and “violence is on the rise”). 
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volatile manner and could become very violent.130 The physical atmosphere is also 
unhealthy, as evidenced by elevated rates of respiratory problems among 
inmates.131 Tellingly, many prison nursery programs require mothers to sign 
waivers absolving the prison of responsibility for harm to or medical problems 
with their babies.132 
Anyone who has ever entered a federal or state prison in the United States 
must be aware that the environment is dramatically different from that outside, and 
that difference principally explains the age limits in prison nursery programs, 
because administrators fear it would be detrimental to a child to be aware of his or 
her surroundings in prison.133 But children are affected by their physical and social 
environments even before they have conscious conceptual awareness or 
understanding of them, regardless of whether they will remember the experience. 
Infant brains process information from their environments intensely, and 
experiences even in the earliest days of life can psychologically affect a child 
throughout life.134 Although prison officials endeavor to make nursery units more 
pleasant, they are still units in a prison—populated by prison inmates, controlled 
by prison guards, subject to the strict prison regimentation, and very limited in 
both space and variety of experiences. A team of child development experts 
summarized concerns about children’s well-beings in prison nurseries: 
 
Prison is by definition a very constraining institution. . . . 
. . . Living space is reduced and children often share small cells with 
their mothers. This spatial shrinking is in contradiction with a child’s 
needs to move, to discover his environment and to be surrounded by a 
rich and diversified milieu.  
Prison also imposes strict temporal constraints. Activities take place 
in rigid and regulated sequences. . . . While regularity is a good thing for 
a child, it goes too far in prison . . . . 
                                                     
130 See, e.g., id. (describing an incident in a Canadian prison in which a woman, after 
learning her child had been removed because the woman refused a drug test, took a guard 
hostage). 
131 See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 94 (noting that inmates suffer a higher rate 
of asthma compared to nonincarcerated persons). 
132 See VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 9. 
133 Id.; Vallely, supra note 119 (noting that Britain generally does not permit mothers 
to keep their children in prison mother-baby units after they reach eighteen months because 
“[a]fter that, child development experts say, the harmful effects of being in an institution 
start to outweigh the benefits of being with their mother”).  
134 See Douglas F. Goldsmith et al., Separation and Reunification: Using Attachment 
Theory and Research to Inform Decisions Affecting the Placements of Children in Foster 
Care, JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 8 (2004). (“Infants are capable of recalling experiences from 
the first days of life. . . . The memories are largely perceptual and are encoded through 
touch and sound. . . . [E]ven years following an event, though inaccessible to 
consciousness, the memory may still influence the child’s behavior and physiological 
responses.”). 
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Social deprivation is evident . . . . Cut off from the outside world, 
human exchanges are limited to the same people, prisoners and guards, 
most of whom are women. The hierarchical prison structure also imposes 
restrictions. Prisoners are at the bottom of the ladder and stay there. 
Personal autonomy is discouraged and various controls discourage 
responsible behavior. A mother is generally not allowed to freely care for 
her child. . . . [S]he is dependent on prison personnel who monitor her 
continuously. . . . [S]urveillance per se generates stress and anxiety.  
. . . . 
. . . Living conditions in prison, where stress levels are high both in 
the milieu as well as in the mother’s subjective world, diminish her 
protective capacities and her ability to set aside the vicissitudes of her 
personal life, her mood variations, her anxieties, etc. . . . [T]his 
constitutes a serious risk factor for the child.  
. . . Neither [mother nor child] can escape the other’s frustrations 
and mood swings, perhaps contributing to . . . simultaneous apathy and 
nervousness.  
. . . . 
. . . [M]other-child proximity in prison . . . acts as a brake in the 
child’s autonomization process. 
. . . . 
. . . Indeed, constraints imposed on their relationship limits the 
possibility of separation and the emergence of symbolic representation 
which is one of the basic instruments of cognitive development.135 
 
In addition, infants confined to a prison unit for months and even years are 
deprived of a wide array of experiences that ordinarily stimulate cognitive, 
emotional, and physical development in children.136 A mother who left Bedford 
Hills with her seventeen-month-old daughter described how the girl “freaked out” 
at seeing blowing leaves and was “petrified of cars,” never having experienced 
either before.137 In addition, the only males that infants in prison nurseries observe 
are prison guards, who treat the female inmates in an authoritarian and often 
abusive manner.138 
                                                     
135 Philip D. Jaffé et al., Children Imprisoned with their Mothers: Psychological 
Implications, in ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
402−04 (Santiago Redondo et al. eds., 1997). 
136 See Flowers, supra note 46, at 2 (noting the results of study of prison nursery 
children in which “[s]ocial and emotional screening in toddlerhood showed high scores for 
potential problems”); Vallely, supra note 119 (describing “[a] sterile life” for infants inside 
a prison). 
137 Tracy Murphy, Mom: Having my Daughter in Prison Motivated Me, HLN (June 4, 
2013), http://www.hlntv.com/video/2013/06/04/prison-moms-babies. 
138 See Santo, supra note 104; Kelly Virella, Male Guards, Female Inmates and 
Sexual Abuse in NYS Prisons, CITY LIMITS (May 3, 2011), http://www.citylimits.org/news/ 
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The concern is not limited to residential programs. Just visiting a parent in 
prison can be upsetting for children because of the prison’s ominous environment, 
hostile guards and inmates, harsh procedures, and radical disempowerment of the 
parent.139 A recent study found “visitation during a mother’s incarceration 
predicted less child attachment security.”140 Many custodians of children in the 
community, whose mothers are in prison, object to visits because they believe, 
often based on past experience, that entering the prison environment will 
traumatize the children.141 Many courts, also citing concern about the 
psychological impact visiting a prison may have on children, have refused to issue 
orders sought after by prisoners that would require a child’s caretaker to bring the 
child to prison for visitation.142 Many prison officials likewise express this 
worry.143 Even many mothers in visitation or nursery programs themselves voice 
the view that prison is no place for children and their worries about the impact that 
the prison environment might have.144 One mother, whose son spent some 
weekends with her in a Tennessee prison, stated that “she hopes his 2-year-old 
brain isn’t capable of remembering his formative years in prison.”145  
Few advocates for placing children in prisons acknowledge, let alone address 
the implications of, the potential harms to children from entering such a tense, 
stressful, antagonistic, demoralizing, and stifling environment.146 Some aim to 
                                                     
articles/4325/male-guards-female-inmates-and-sexual-abuse-in-nys-prisons#.UnkXe-KzL- 
5. 
139 See Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 294–95; Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny 
of Time: Vulnerable Children, “Bad” Mothers, and Statutory Deadlines in Parental 
Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 176, 216 (2004). 
140 See Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 320 (emphasis in original).  
141 See Costa, supra note 23, at 83–85; Vainik, supra note 12, at 679. 
142 See Solangel Maldonado, Recidivism and Paternal Engagement, 40 FAM. L.Q. 
191, 201–05 (2006); see also Standard Pa. Practice § 126:1078 (2012) (indicating there is a 
“presumption that visitation with an incarcerated parent is not in the best interests of the 
child”). 
143 See Mauskopf, supra note 78, at 110–11; Vainik, supra note 12, at 683 (“[P]rison 
administrators adamantly feel that children do not belong in prisons . . . .”); Clare Dyer, 
Prisons Consider More Baby Units, GUARDIAN (Aug. 29, 2000, 10:02 PM), http://www.the 
guardian.com/uk/2000/aug/30/prisonsandprobation.society (quoting a representative of the 
Prison Reform Trust in the U.K. as saying, “In trying to do the right thing the prison 
service is in danger of making things worse. Prison is not a place for children.”).  
144 See, e.g., Handwerk, supra note 24 (incarcerated mothers state “prison is no place 
for kids”); La Rosa, supra note 29 (noting that “inmates complain of the peeling paint, 
roaches, and bad plumbing”); Walden, supra note 38 (noting that some incarcerated 
mothers and critics say “prison is not an appropriate environment for children and that 
living in prison may have harmful effects on the child later in life”). 
145 Quinn, supra note 28. 
146 The few advocates for incarcerated women who do acknowledge the harms do so 
in support of transferring inmates to community-based facilities to be with their children. 
E.g., Abramowicz, supra note 90, at 872–73 (discussing community-based facilities as a 
 
494 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
bolster their position by cagily asserting that adverse effects on children have not 
been shown147 while failing to mention that there has been almost no effort among 
child development researchers to study the effects on children.148 Some rely on an 
assertion that the prison environment is better than the neighborhoods the mothers 
came from.149 Although this is likely true in some respects (e.g., less violence and 
drug abuse in prison), they overlook the reality that women exiting prison almost 
always return to wherever they came from, and these advocates studiously avoid 
the topic of adoption, a far more attractive option for newborns than either the 
default regime or prison. 
 
3.  Improbability of Attachment 
 
A crucial empirical claim many advocates assert is that, despite any 
adversities in the prison environment, a child will form a secure attachment with 
the mother that will constitute a basis for a healthy and permanent mother-child 
relationship.150 Yet there is no evidence that visitation programs accomplish 
this,151 and what little evidence there is of outcomes for former prison nursery 
babies suggests that only a small percentage meet this expectation. As explained 
below, available evidence suggests children-in-prison programs are actually more 
likely to undermine attachment and produce even worse outcomes than the default 
regime. By this measure, prison nurseries are a failure for the vast majority of 
children and a reckless gamble for all. 
                                                     
“place for mothers . . . to live with their children and avoid the separation and trauma that 
the mother’s incarceration in a prison facility would inflict on the child”); Pollack, supra 
note 25, at 19-7 (noting that furloughs avoid subjecting children “to the negative and 
frightening elements of a prison visit”); REPORT CARD, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that a 
community-based nursery is “far better situated to serve the unique physical and emotional 
needs of a mother and her child” than is a prison nursery). 
147 See, e.g., Alexander’s Testimony, supra note 19; An Act Establishing a Child 
Nursery Facility at the Connecticut Correctional Institution, Niantic: Hearing on H.B. 
6642 Before the Judiciary Comm. (Conn. 2013) (testimony of Civic Trust Public Lobbying 
Co. in support of Conn. H.B. No 6642). 
148 See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 276–77 (“Data regarding child-specific 
outcomes after participation in a nursery program are also critical endpoints but have rarely 
been collected. . . . Research assessing US outcomes other than recidivism is nascent.”). 
149 See, e.g., Suzanne Smalley, Should Female Inmates Raise Their Babies in Prison, 
NEWSWEEK (May 13, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/should-female-inmates- 
raise-their-babies-prison-80247 (“A prison may not seem like the best place to raise 
infants. But researchers are finding that it’s better than the alternative.”). 
150 See VILLANUEVA, supra note 1, at 22 (“[P]romoting maternal attachment is a 
primary argument for the creation of prison nurseries.”); Kusmer, supra note 30; Pojman, 
supra note 29, at 60 (“Mother-child bonding and attachment are at the crux of the prison 
nursery debate.”). 
151 See Mary W. Byrne et al., Maternal Separations During the Reentry Years for 100 
Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 77, 78 (2012). 
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Attachment is a child’s psychological identification with and emotional 
connection to a permanent caregiver. Secure attachment is the foundation for 
healthy child development and appropriate social and emotional functioning later 
in life.152 Children who fail to form a secure attachment “tend to see the world as 
threatening and unpredictable”153 and consequently “have difficulties with anxiety, 
anger, aggression, depression, and mental disorganization.”154 These psychological 
effects in turn lead to deficiencies in physical health and development, “cognitive 
problems, speech and language delays, sensory integration difficulties and . . . 
social and behavioral abnormalities.”155 Attachment failure “retards socioemo-
tional development and produces emotional withdrawal, indiscriminate socializing, 
lack of impulse control, failure to internalize moral norms, and psychiatric 
disorders such as depression, anxiety, hyperactivity, and disruptive behavior.”156 
Adults who failed to form a secure attachment as children have great difficulty 
with intimate relationships, social interactions, and control of impulses and 
emotions; thus, they are at high risk for psychopathology and sociopathology, as 
well as criminal behavior likely to lead them to prison.157 In short, attachment 
failure is the root cause of the intergenerational cycle of dysfunction and 
criminality. 
For many reasons, putting babies in prison with incarcerated birth mothers is 
not a sensible strategy for promoting healthy attachment. First, as explained above, 
prison is far from a nurturing environment, and mothers “who are anxious or 
preoccupied with their own difficulties tend to be inconsistently responsive, 
causing the children in their care to develop an insecure pattern of attachment.”158 
Second, incarcerated women’s long-standing psychological and emotional 
problems pose an obstacle to their ability to give babies the kind of attention and 
interactions the babies need.159 Third, there are the crucial matters of timing and 
continuity, which are given far too little attention in the literature and policy 
discussions about prison nurseries. The critical time period for attachment begins 
                                                     
152 Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 314. 
153 Id. at 315. 
154 Id. 
155 Charles H. Zeanah et al., Designing Research to Study the Effects of 
Institutionalization on Brain and Behavioral Development: The Bucharest Early 
Intervention Project, 15 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 885, 886 (2003) (citations omitted). 
156 Dwyer, supra note 63, at 422 n.74 (citing developmental literature documenting 
these effects). 
157 See Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 317–18. 
158 Id. at 315. 
159 See Carla Candelori & Maria Dal Dosso, An Experience of Infant Observation in a 
Prison, 10 INFANT OBSERVATION 59, 59 (2007); Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 
316–19 (“Caregivers who are unaware of or uncomfortable with their own emotions . . . 
encourage their children to suppress needs and feelings and develop . . . compulsive self-
reliance and . . . avoidance. . . . Disorganized attachment is predictable from a caregiver’s 
unresolved, incoherent feelings about his or her own losses or traumas . . . .”).  
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after a child reaches the developmental stage of animate-object permanence, which 
is typically at around five months, and it continues roughly to age twenty-four 
months.160 Before that time period, children need consistent nurturing and positive 
stimulation, but it is not essential that the nurturing come from the person(s) who 
will ultimately be the attachment figure(s).161 Thus, placement of newborns 
immediately in prison cannot be justified as necessary to a child’s attachment.162 
More important, once the process of forming an attachment to the expected 
permanent caregiver commences, it takes substantial time to complete, and it is 
crucial that the infant receive continuous nurturance from that caregiver throughout 
this period.163 Thus, significant separations are threatening to the attachment 
process and likely psychologically damaging.164 
The realities of incarceration are simply not compatible with this requirement 
of stability and continuity. For a woman whose release is scheduled six to eighteen 
months after the child’s birth, the attachment process might have begun but not 
proceeded far when the mother is thrust back into the community and all its 
challenges. The enormous stress of reentry, discussed further below, can interfere 
with the attachment process even if a mother and child remain together. The reality 
is that separation is very common because many mothers resume substance abuse, 
reenter prison, commit child maltreatment, or simply become unwilling or unable 
to retain custody of their children.165 For women whose release dates are beyond 
                                                     
160 Jaffé et al., supra note 135, at 404; Daniel S. Schechter & Erica Willheim, 
Disturbances of Attachment and Parental Psychopathology in Early Childhood, 18 CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM., 665, 666 (2009) (“The emergence of 
stranger wariness and separation protest, beginning at approximately 7 to 9 months of age 
and consolidating by the end of the first year of life, signals the establishment of the 
attachment system with its discrimination of, and preference for, the primary attachment 
figure.”). 
161 See VIVIEN PRIOR & DANYA GLASER, UNDERSTANDING ATTACHMENT AND 
ATTACHMENT DISORDERS: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE 19–20 (2006); Thompson et 
al., Group Report: Early Social Attachment and Its Consequences, in ATTACHMENT AND 
BONDING: A NEW SYNTHESIS 349, 363 (C. Sue Carter et al. eds., 2006). 
162 This is borne out also by studies showing that children placed in adoptive homes 
anytime in the first six months have attachment outcomes as good as children who grow up 
with biological parents. See Portello, supra note 92, at 178–79. 
163 See Goldsmith et al., supra note 134, at 9 (describing the risk that separation from 
an established caregiver will cause a child to experience a “serious emotional crisis, 
creating at best an adjustment disorder and at worst the development of reactive attachment 
disorder,” even when the child is returning to a former caregiver and attachment figure); 
Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 317. 
164 See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 87.  
165 See infra notes 241–252 and accompanying text; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, 1997 
INTERIM MEETING OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION REPORTS OF THE COUNSEL 
ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS 4, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/csaph/csai-
97.pdf (recommending against creation of more prison nurseries because “it has not been 
prove[n] that the skills provided to these mothers and the bonds created between the mother 
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the dates their babies will “age out” of the program, as occurs with some frequency 
in New York,166 the attachment process will necessarily be disrupted because the 
babies must separate from the mothers. A child typically then goes to live with 
relatives, likely having little or no contact with the mother thereafter for as long as 
she remains in prison.167 When the mother does emerge, and if she then assumes 
custody despite all the challenges facing her, this causes another potentially 
damaging dislocation in the child’s life.168 In addition, prison officials 
expeditiously eject from nurseries mothers who violate prison rules, and in those 
cases also the attachment process is disrupted.169  
The literature on prison nurseries generally overlooks the crucial fact that 
separation from a caregiver after the attachment process is underway or completed 
is psychologically traumatic and developmentally damaging for a child, whose 
understanding of, comfort with, and trust in the world has been made to depend on 
that one person.170 Even if positive things happen between mother and child while 
a mother is in the intensely controlled environment in the prison, it is vital to know 
what is likely to happen after mother and child exit prison. Policy makers need to 
                                                     
and infant are maintained after they leave the facility”); Mental Stress: Unique Solutions 
for Unique Populations, TEX. MED. OBSERVER, http://txmorgv.com/news/mental-stress-
unique-solutions-for-unique-populations/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing results of 
research on the parenting of former prison nursery mothers, finding that “the majority used 
psychological aggression and minor physical assault against their children, and mothers 
who had faced significant depression were more likely to utilize physical assault”). 
166 See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–84.  
167 See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 5, at 6, 18 (reporting that only about half of 
mothers in state prisons had weekly communication with their children, that over half of 
incarcerated mothers never had a visit from their children, and only one-fifth had a visit 
monthly or more frequently); Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 320 (listing some 
reasons why children do not visit parents in prison); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1496–97.  
168 Makariev & Shaver, supra note 11, at 320. 
169 See MAWHORR, supra note 42, at 7 (reporting study showing 15% of mothers in 
Ohio’s prison nursery were ejected for rule infraction or inattention to their babies); 
Deborah Jiang Stein, Babies Behind Bars Nurseries for Incarcerated Mothers and Their 
Children, CHILDREN’S VOICE (July/Aug. 2010), http://www.cwla.org/voice/JA10babi 
es.html (noting that prison policies are generally quite harsh, requiring the removal of a 
baby from the prison if a mother commits any rule infraction, including just a verbal 
altercation with another inmate). 
170 See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 198–200 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing 
expert testimony on the effect of parent-child removal); Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 389–
90 (noting that “attachment depends on contextual stability in the early years of life . . . . 
[C]onsideration needs to be given to potential threats created by separations . . . [and] 
[d]evelopment of an attachment relationship is a long and fragile process . . . .”); Byrne et 
al., supra note 151, at 80 (“Separations threaten the evolving neurobiological attachment 
system.”); Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 295; Pollack, supra note 25, at 19-4 
(summarizing studies and research on the effects of attachment disruption); Stein, supra 
note 169 (recounting struggles of a woman who, as a child, spent her first year in prison 
and thereafter was consigned to foster care).  
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ask this crucial question: Are women who get sentenced to state prison generally 
individuals whom children can depend on—both while they serve their time and 
after they leave prison—to always to be there for the children and provide them 
with good care. If the answer is negative, the state should be looking for healthier, 
more reliable, and better-functioning parents for these children. 
 
4.  Barriers to Reentry 
 
Advocates for prison nurseries generally avoid discussing what mothers and 
infants face when the mothers complete their sentence. Yet in other contexts, 
advocates for incarcerated women regularly emphasize the formidable challenges 
these women face upon reentry.171 Those challenges largely explain the very high 
rate at which mothers separate from prison babies after release. One commentator 
warns of potential difficulties: 
 
[M]ost inmate-mothers have low literacy, limited education, limited 
work experience, and past alcohol, drug, or mental health problems. 
These limitations, in addition to their criminal records, severely curtail 
post-release employment opportunities for mothers who have been 
incarcerated.  
In addition . . . these women are likely to have court-ordered 
demands on their time. If past alcohol, drug, or mental health problems 
are a matter of record . . . when a mother is released, she must be referred 
for treatment ordered by the court, as well as aftercare ordered as a 
condition of her release to community supervision. There are often 
waiting lists for such programs and often delays in referrals from her 
caseworker as well. In addition . . . the mother must attend court hearings 
relevant to [any child neglect, abandonment, or abuse proceedings]. 
These hearings are often adjourned multiple times. 
If a mother must attend multiple court hearings, substance abuse 
programs, and other requirements of both the Department of Corrections 
and the Bureau of Child Welfare, along with reestablishing periods of 
visitation with her children, it is doubtful she will keep her employment 
for long. . . . However, without such employment she cannot hope to 
provide a home for her children . . . .172  
                                                     
171 See, e.g., BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 16, 21. 
172 Day, supra note 83, at 236–37; see also Carlson, supra note 47, at 22 (noting that 
hoped-for “aftercare programs to help women and their babies transition smoothly from the 
prison to the community” have not materialized “due to a lack of funding”); Stephanie S. 
Covington, Challenges Facing Women Released From Prison, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, 
supra note 8, at 44-1, 44-2 (proposing that planning for incarcerated women’s reentry into 
the community should begin as soon as a woman begins serving her prison sentence rather 
than thirty to sixty days before release, which often provides inadequate resources for the 
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Many ex-inmates also must deal with substantial resentment from family 
members, especially those who took on the burden of caring for older children 
while their mothers were in prison.173 Most ex-inmates have little contact with any 
family or friends outside of prison during their sentence, so they lack a support 
network when they return to the community.174 
Mothers released from prison also have criminal histories likely to “make it 
more difficult . . . to obtain a job, live in subsidized housing, obtain an education, 
and obtain welfare benefits . . . .”175 Such “social exclusions . . . quite effectively 
relegate ex-offenders to the margins of legitimate society,”176 where they are likely 
to return to the dysfunctions of the past. Federal law requires states to exclude 
from welfare benefits and food stamp programs individuals who have been 
convicted of a felony involving possession, use, or distribution of drugs.177 This 
leaves many without means to house, feed, and clothe themselves, let alone take 
care of children and search for work.178 Living with relatives is not an option for 
those whose relatives are poor and therefore unable to add another member to the 
household, or for those with relatives in public housing who could be evicted if an 
ex-convict lives with them.179 Some job training and educational loan programs 
exclude ex-convicts, yet most mothers have neither a high school diploma nor job 
skills when they enter prison, and, in any event, these women need employment 
immediately just to survive and cannot devote time to such programs.180 
Additionally, returning to the community after even just one year in prison is 
                                                     
women upon release from prison); Pfaff, supra note 5, at 1107–08 (discussing the 
“collateral costs” of incarceration). 
173 See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 103, at 811; Mawhorr, supra note 42, at 26; Quinn, 
supra note 28 (noting that one woman’s “mother is raising her 2- and 3-year old sons, but 
is so angry at her for getting in trouble that she had her phone blocked from receiving calls 
from her daughter”). 
174 See BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 16; Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 95; 
Creasie Finney Hairston & James Rollin, Prisoner Reentry: Social Capital and Family 
Connections, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 4-1, 4-3–4-5. 
175 Abramowicz, supra note 90, at 813; see also McGalliard, supra note 108; Michael 
Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 586–87 
(2006) (citing ineligibility for welfare benefits, educational grants, public housing, and 
certain types of jobs and licenses as collateral consequences of criminal convictions); Ross, 
supra note 139, at 215 (describing laws denying public assistance and public housing to 
persons with drug-related convictions). 
176 Pinard & Thompson, supra note 175, at 590. 
177 See 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012). 
178 See Patricia Allard, Unintended Victims of the Lifetime Welfare Ban for Drug 
Offenders, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 16-1, 16-8 to -17. 
179 Id. at 16-9 to -17. 
180 Id. at 16-11 to -14; see also Maureen Norton-Hawk, Forgotten Victims: The 
Children of Incarcerated Mothers, in WOMEN AND GIRLS, supra note 8, at 21-1, 21-2. 
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typically quite disorienting, given the dramatic difference in structure, norms, and 
demands relative to prison life.181 
Thus, released inmates’ lives are typically characterized by lack of lawful 
employment, instability in housing, lack of child care, efforts to recover older 
children from foster care or the custody of family members, little support from 
extended family and the state, struggles with environmental factors that led to the 
prior criminal activity and substance abuse, difficulty reestablishing relationships 
and overcoming the resentment of their children and other family members, serial 
cohabitation with men who are not the children’s father and could pose a danger to 
the children, risk of partner abuse, additional unintended pregnancies, and 
depression and other mental health problems.182 In the midst of all these severe 
challenges, these women must act as single parents to all their children, some of 
whom are likely troubled and extremely needy.183 It is simply unrealistic to expect 
them adequately to care for an infant upon release from prison.184 
                                                     
181 See Margaret Oot Hayes, Mothering After Imprisonment, in INTERRUPTED LIFE, 
supra note 83, at 388–91 (discussing the many “obstacles” most women encounter after 
being released from prison); Jose-Kampfner, supra note 113, at 123 (“Prison creates 
dependent women who have difficulty adapting to the outside.”). 
182 See Covington, supra note 172, at 44–42 (“[M]any women find themselves either 
homeless or in environments that do not support sober living.”); Goshin & Byrne, supra 
note 118, at 95 (“Reentry is further complicated for women who resume childcare 
responsibilities soon after release.”); Jacobs, supra note 103, at 811–14 (noting the 
economic challenges facing women released from prison); Shirley A. Hill, Why Won’t 
African Americans Get (and Stay) Married? Why Should They?, in MARRIAGE AND 
FAMILY: PERSPECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES 345, 356 (H. Elizabeth Peters et al. eds., 2009) 
(“The courtship practices of young African American men who lack decent jobs or respect 
in mainstream society are often characterized by deceit, violence, and a general disrespect 
for women.”); id. at 358 (noting “the diminishing support single mothers are receiving 
from the state and their extended families”); Jose-Kampfner, supra note 113, at 122–24 
(“The re-adaptation to the world is complex. Prisoners have to re-establish relationships 
with their children and family, which are very difficult to just pick up after years of being 
away . . . . [R]esuming a relationship after a long period of time needs support and 
intensive therapy.”); Leslie Margolin, Child Abuse by Mothers’ Boyfriends: Why the 
Overrepresentation?, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 541, 548 (1992) (“[A]lthough mothers’ 
boyfriends perform comparatively little child care, they are responsible for more child 
abuse than any other nonparental caregivers.”); Aruna Radhakrishna et al., Are Father 
Surrogates a Risk Factor for Child Maltreatment?, 6 CHILD MALTREATMENT 281, 286 
(2001) (finding the presence in the home of a man who is not a child’s biological father to 
be a predictor of child maltreatment); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual 
Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 262–66 (2001) 
(discussing the especially high risk of physical and sexual abuse for daughters of single 
mothers); Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 144–45 (noting high recidivism rates among women 
released from prison). 
183 Some scholars have noted that the “collateral consequences” of incarceration 
might impact women more severely than men, precisely because they are generally 
expected to bear responsibility for children upon release. See, e.g., Marne L. Lenox, 
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Most female convicts come from areas of deep poverty and pervasive crime, 
areas without readily accessible support and rehabilitation services or employment 
opportunities.185 The vast majority reacted to this environment in the past by 
abusing drugs and alcohol and repeatedly committing crimes.186 For most, the 
children they had before going to prison suffered maltreatment in their care.187 It 
should not be surprising, then, that rates of child neglect, abuse, and abandonment; 
resumption of substance abuse; and return to prison are quite high among ex-
inmate mothers.188 These are predominantly women who have long dealt with 
adversity and pain by self-medicating with drugs, and life after prison contains 
even greater adversities than existed before.189 Neither the prisons nor the 
                                                     
Neutralizing the Gendered Collateral Consequences of the War on Drugs, 86 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 280, 293–99 (2011). 
184 See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 95 (“The search for the necessities of 
survival often dominates the immediate post-release period . . . . This struggle may worsen 
instead of improve over time as . . . women are overwhelmed with life events and family 
obligations.” (citations omitted)); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1499 (“[P]ost-prison collateral 
penalties make it difficult to maintain a relationship with their children. A host of state and 
federal laws impose draconian obstacles to a mother’s successful reentry . . . .”).  
185 See Allard, supra note 178, at 16-13 to -14 (recognizing a lack of drug treatment 
programs in low-income communities); Jacobs, supra note 103, at 799 (stating that one 
cost of high incarceration rates for black women is “a continued break down of already 
fragile family and community structures”); id. at 803 (observing “poverty and lack of 
community-based resources and criminality” in neighborhoods from which most 
incarcerated women come); id. at 811 (noting higher prearrest poverty rates among female 
inmates than male); Ross, supra note 139, at 211–12 (describing survey of state 
governments that found the vast majority reported insufficient drug treatment programs); 
id. at 214 (“[E]ffective treatment programs for women involved with the criminal justice 
system are virtually non-existent.”); Scott, supra note 83, at 216. 
186 See Norton-Hawk, supra note 180, at 21-2 (“Drug use is endemic within this 
population. Almost all the women have tried a variety of both legal and illegal addictive 
drugs . . . .”); id. at 21-2 to 21-3 (noting the median number of incarcerations for women 
studied was three). 
187 See id. at 21-3. 
188 See BRAMAN, supra note 73, at 54–57 (describing the high rate of return to drugs 
among recently released convicts); Covington, supra note 172, at 44-2 (“Without strong 
support in the community to help them navigate the multiple systems and agencies, many 
offenders fall back into a life of substance abuse and criminal activity.”); Failinger, supra 
note 83, at 500 (“[W]omen offenders frequently take out the rage that they have suppressed 
from their own childhood experiences on their children, or neglect or abandon their 
children as they descend into the hopeless vortex of drugs and crime.”); Ross, supra note 
139, at 212 (citing evidence that drug abusers tend to experience repeated relapses even 
when receiving treatment); Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 145 (noting a 39% rate of return to 
prison for women in California within three years of release). 
189 See Walden, supra note 38 (discussing mothers who had their babies in prison 
nursery and resumed substance abuse after release); see also Saar, supra note 97 (noting 
that women are often victims of violence before “self-medicating” with illegal drugs); Wolf 
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community provide the treatment these women need to avoid replicating past 
patterns.190 For most, their own family members have little hope of their doing 
so.191  
Indeed, even inmates and former inmates express a sense of fatalism about 
life after release from prison. One former prison-nursery mother explained, “The 
funny thing about addiction is it doesn’t matter how much you love your child. It 
doesn’t matter how much you want to do good . . . . The addiction has this force 
that if you don’t address what the issues are surrounding the addiction, you’re 
always going to go back to it.”192 Another, who had entered prison pregnant three 
times, said that after each time she was paroled, she “did what I normally did on 
the outside because that’s what addicts do. We’re selfish. . . . The babies aren’t 
going to get us clean . . . . I have six kids and that didn’t cure me.”193  
Advocates for women in prison nevertheless commonly assert that programs 
unifying them with their children greatly reduce recidivism rates, thus lessening 
the chance of later separation.194 This pitch is crucial to winning the support of 
                                                     
et al., supra note 4, at 143 (“Compared to men, women are less likely to use drugs for 
pleasure. Instead, women use drugs to ‘self-medicate’ depression or stress, to numb 
themselves from the emotional pain of abuse, or as a means to escape from conditions of 
poverty that create emotional stress.”); id. at 144–45 (“Fifty-one percent of the women 
committed to California prisons in 2004 were parolees returned to custody. . . . In 1998, 
more than half the women returned to prison for parole violations returned for drug 
offenses.”). 
190 See Wolf et al., supra note 4, at 145; see also McGalliard, supra note 108 
(“Prisons, as opposed to being places where people can be rehabilitated in the hope of 
establishing law-abiding lives and becoming productive members of society, are typically 
warehouses to store people until their time has been served. Furthermore, in these cash-
strapped times, budget cuts often mean slashing what few services exist, such as 
educational, drug treatment or mental health programs.”); BRAMAN, supra note 73, at 56–
57 (discussing the lack of effective drug treatment in and out of prison); Makariev & 
Shaver, supra note 11, at 325 (explaining a lack of attachment-related assistance for 
incarcerated parents); Pinard & Thompson, supra note 175, at 590. 
191 See JESSICA MEYERSON ET AL., VOLUNTEERS OF AM., CHILDHOOD DISRUPTED: 
UNDERSTANDING THE FEATURES AND EFFECTS OF MATERNAL INCARCERATION 16 (2010), 
available at http://www.voa.org/Childhood-Disrupted-Report (reporting a survey result 
that 81% of nonparent primary caregivers for children of incarcerated parents expect to 
remain the caregiver after the parent’s release); id. at 23 (conveying nonparent caregivers’ 
distrust of incarcerated parents); id. at 24 (noting that many nonparent caregivers relinquish 
physical custody to a mother upon release “contingent upon her ability to ‘get her life in 
order’”). 
192 Walden, supra note 38. 
193 Haddock, supra note 80, at E1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
194 DIAMOND & ORWISH-GROSS, supra note 81, at 2 (“There is considerable research 
evidence to show that Prison Nursery Programs reduce recidivism rates for incarcerated 
mothers that are released.”); Fearn & Parker, supra note 78, at 40; Ford, supra note 78 
(“[A] powerful benefit is that women participating in such programs have far lower 
recidivism rates.”); Gilad & Gat, supra note 19, at 387–89, 391; Haverty, supra note 52 
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legislators and prison officials. But there is actually no evidentiary support for the 
claim, and the foregoing discussion gives reason for skepticism. No studies purport 
to show reduced recidivism as a result of visitation programs, and those that 
advocates tout as showing nursery programs cause a reduction in reoffense rate in 
fact do no such thing. Many advocates cite a report from the Nebraska Correctional 
Center for Women, which states that in the four years before initiation of a prison 
nursery, one-third of women who delivered a baby while incarcerated returned to 
prison within three years because of a new crime, whereas in the first five years of 
the nursery program, only 9% of nursery graduates had returned after release.195 
Some cite similar statistics in two other states (26% vs. 13% in New York and 
39% vs. 17% in Washington) as supposed proof that prison nurseries cause a 
reduction in recidivism.196 
But that is a misuse of data that anyone with minimal social science 
sophistication would recognize. These studies clearly suffer from a selection-bias 
problem; in layman’s terms, they compare apples and oranges. Nursery 
participants are a special subset of all women who give birth while incarcerated. 
The states in which these studies were conducted all impose some form of 
screening that excludes candidates who are especially unpromising because of their 
history, taking into account the seriousness of their crimes, as reflected in the 
                                                     
(asserting that participating in prison nursery programs cuts a woman’s chances of 
reoffending in half); Erin Jordan, Prison Nurseries Cut Female Inmates’ Risk of 
Reoffending, GAZETTE (Jan. 31, 2011, 7:52 AM), http://thegazette.com/2011/01/31/prison-
nurseries-cut-female-inmates-risk-of-reoffending/ (quoting Joseph Carlson, author of the 
report on Nebraska’s prison nursery, as saying that “[the program] reduces recidivism”). 
195 See, e.g., Gilad & Gat, supra note 19, at 388; Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 
276; Vainik, supra note 12, at 683. A more recent report on recidivism in Nebraska, by the 
same researcher, Carlson, supra note 47, which will also likely be widely cited with the 
false claim that it proves prison nurseries reduce recidivism, claims that the prenursery 
recidivism rate was actually 50%, for the same four-year period studied in the earlier 
report. Id. at 21–22. It also found a higher recidivism rate—17%—than in the earlier study 
for women who completed the prison nursery program. Id. For both groups, the sample was 
rather small, and the researcher failed to indicate whether the rate difference was 
statistically significant. Id. at 22 (showing a sample of thirty mothers for the prenursery 
period and sixty-five prison nursery mothers for the ten-year period studied). In addition, it 
appears the researcher did not look at a set time period following reentry for all released 
inmates, such as three years postrelease, but rather looked for any recidivism up to the year 
2007 for members of the two groups. This means the study looked at recidivism within 
seventeen years for some women and recidivism within three years for others, which 
obviously undermines the comparison. This study also suffers from the selection bias 
problems discussed below, though the author of the report did not acknowledge this. 
196 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 47, at 18, 22 (providing recidivism statistics for nine 
states that allow incarcerated mothers to keep their babies). 
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length of their sentences.197 As noted above, most programs categorically exclude 
women with longer sentences, histories of violence, or past child maltreatment 
convictions. Moreover, the prison nursery group in these studies does not include 
the substantial percentage of mothers who begin the nursery program but then drop 
out, either by choice or because of disciplinary action; the studies do not count 
them in the nursery group but rather in the nonnursery group, thus further stacking 
the deck in favor of finding a positive outcome with nursery mothers relative to 
other inmates.198 
At most, these comparative recidivism figures support a conclusion that the 
women who enter and complete a prison nursery program as currently operated are 
at a lower risk of returning to prison than are other inmates. But this might be so 
entirely because those women have characteristics that would have translated into 
a low reoffense rate even if there were no nursery program. These figures in no 
way show that imprisoning babies with female criminals heals those inmates or 
changes their dispositions. Indeed, the cited statistics are consistent with a 
hypothesis that nursery programs increase recidivism for that special population. 
The programs could have this effect if having babies with them distracts women 
from rehabilitative work they need to do, prevents them from advancing 
educationally, undermines the deterrent impact of incarceration,199 or imposes a 
responsibility on them that upon leaving prison becomes a source of great 
additional stress for them. We simply do not know what the recidivism rate would 
be for those women who qualify for and persist through the nursery programs in 
the absence of those programs, so claims that the programs have been shown to 
reduce recidivism are indefensible and irresponsible. 
That the programs attempt to screen out higher-risk inmates counts in their 
favor from a child-centered perspective. But the primary reason legislators and 
prison officials support these programs—namely, the promise that they will cause 
a reduction in recidivism—remains entirely speculative. Some prison directors 
themselves express strong skepticism. An Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction assessment of the state’s prison nursery concluded, after describing the 
poor service delivery in the program, the limited time the women were in the 
program, the fact that the great majority of them already had children when they 
entered prison, and the severe difficulties they faced upon exit, that “program 
developers should not expect that this ‘programming’ will have any impact on the 
likelihood that these women will recidivate.”200 
                                                     
197 See, e.g., id. at 21 (stating that thirty women were denied entry into the prison 
nursery in Nebraska during the study period, nearly half as many as were studied); 
Mawhorr, supra note 42, at 6 (showing that 80% of pregnant inmates were excluded). 
198 See Carlson, supra note 47, at 21 (noting that during the ten-year period studied in 
Nebraska, “65 women successfully completed the nursery program . . . [and] [t]hirty-eight 
other women entered the program but did not complete it”). 
199 See, e.g., Kusmer, supra note 30 (quoting an inmate as saying, about being with 
her son in a prison nursery, “When he’s with me, I really don’t feel like I’m incarcerated”). 
200 Mawhorr, supra note 42, at 27. 
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Moreover, as explained above, returning to prison is only one reason why 
mothers separate from children. Another is reverting to substance abuse. Resuming 
or forming relationships with men who do not want the children around or pose a 
danger to the children is another likely cause. Published research confirms a very 
high rate of ultimate mother-child separation suffered by prison babies.201 Further, 
remaining in maternal custody does not necessarily mean living in a safe and 
nurturing environment. The rate of documented maltreatment is high among 
parents with criminal histories, and there is much developmental deprivation that 
never leads to an agency or court finding of maltreatment.202 
 
5.  Prison as Origin and Identity for Black Children 
 
Finally, advocates for prison nurseries and extended visitation also ignore 
other potential negative effects on children. They fail to consider the normalization 
of the prison environment for these children, who are already at heightened risk of 
calling a prison their home when they are adults, and the stigmatizing effect of 
forever having to call a prison “my first home” or “where I am from.” Yet that 
concern is apparent to many other people. For example, in refusing to order that a 
child go to a prison for visitation with a father, a trial court judge in Oregon stated 
the following: 
 
[W]hat would be the impact on this child of growing up being 
exposed to that situation, and being reminded through life that this is his 
origin? I think it almost goes without saying that it would be devastating 
to the child. I don’t think there’s any way that we can say it would be in 
his best interest, but I think it can be almost automatically said that it 
would be horrendously against this child’s best interest to grow up with 
that.203 
 
There is at least anecdotal direct support for the judge’s concern about 
normalization and stigma. One woman who began life in a federal prison wrote 
about her life thereafter: 
 
                                                     
201 See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83 (finding that three years after reentry only 
44% of mothers who participated in New York’s nursery program had custody of their 
children); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 278 (noting a study finding that among 
women exiting Nebraska’s prison nursery, “only 57% retained custody of their children 
post release”). 
202 See Failinger, supra note 83, at 500; Raeder, supra note 78, at 25 (“[O]ne third of 
national maltreatment complaints regarding children in in-home settings were made against 
caregivers who had been previously arrested.”).  
203 Harris v. Burns, 904 P.2d 648, 649 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (upholding order of 
paternity and denial of visitation). 
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I was a girl, a teen, and a woman on edge for all of my life until 
recently. I found it next to impossible to reconcile my roots, for I’ve 
never met a peer with a story quite like mine. 
. . . Inmates are an outcast class, by design cast out of society, so 
without the right support, it’s natural for a child born inside to end up 
feeling outcast as well. 204 
 
Ample indirect support comes from the well-documented phenomenon of 
children who grow up in the community suffering from feeling stigmatized if they 
have a parent in prison.205 And it is plausible to suppose that the internalization of 
a prison identity and the shame that prison babies later experience increases with 
the more time they spend in prison, as this would make their parents’ incarceration 
more prominent in their minds and in their sense of self. 
Of particular importance to the cause of race equality, these concerns about 
normalization and internalization must be especially pronounced with children of 
color, who constitute the majority of children whose mothers are incarcerated. 
Some women’s advocates cite the disproportionate percentage of female inmates 
who are of minority race, as illustrating the social injustice at the root of the 
growing prison population.206 What those advocates fail to recognize is that any 
adverse effects on children from tying them permanently to incarcerated parents 
and making them live in prison during early formative years are going to fall 
disproportionately on children of minority race. We ought to exercise much greater 
caution; we ought to think through the consequences much more thoroughly—
taking into account the complex realities of prison life, children’s developmental 
needs and lived experience, as well as the tremendous obstacles to successful 
reentry—before we put black babies in prison, where they might develop an image 
of themselves as persons who belong behind bars. 
 
 
                                                     
204 Stein, supra note 169. 
205 See BRAMAN, supra note 73, at 60–61 (describing a young girl’s difficulty with 
friends and in school because of her father’s incarceration); Murray & Murray, supra note 
72, at 294 (“Incarceration is highly stigmatizing, and this stigma appears to be ‘sticky,’ 
spreading and adhering to family members, including the children of prisoners. In some 
cases, this stigma can lead to peer hostility and rejection.”).  
206 See, e.g., BLOOM ET AL., supra note 83, at 2 (“While they constitute only 13 
percent of women in the United States, nearly 50 percent of women in prison are African 
American. Black women are eight times more likely than white women to be 
incarcerated.”); Jacobs, supra note 103, at 798 (remarking on “the overwhelming presence 
of women of color, particularly black women, in prisons”); Kennedy, supra note 18, at 
166–67, 169; Levy-Pounds, supra note 74, at 298; Vainik, supra note 12, at 674, 680 
(arguing that current incarceration of black women should be viewed in light of a history in 
which “racist and misogynist attitudes permeated American society”). 
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C.  Advocacy and the Abuse of Social Science Research 
 
The preceding section demonstrates that there are substantial reasons to 
believe the ideal motivating creation of prison nurseries—namely, that newborn 
children will securely attach to their birth mothers, will remain with their mothers 
for the remainder of their childhood, and will live a healthy and happy life—is 
actually highly unlikely to be realized for children placed in prison nurseries. 
Instead, most seem destined for attachment failure, separation from their mothers, 
maltreatment, and long-term mental health problems. Recently published research 
on New York’s prison nurseries substantiates these reasons for fear of bad 
outcomes for prison babies. I devote a subsection to that research because it 
provides an object lesson in how advocates can misuse social science and how 
readily policy makers and legislators can be duped if there is no pushback from 
another constituency, which is especially likely with policy choices harmful to 
children.  
A group at the Columbia University School of Nursing, led by Dr. Mary 
Byrne, conducted a study of one hundred children who entered the prison nurseries 
at maximum-security Bedford Hills and neighboring medium-security Taconic 
Correctional Facility during a three-year period. Byrne’s group at Columbia has for 
many years been providing clinical services to the incarcerated mothers in these 
programs.207 Although the expectation of objectivity in social science research is 
ordinarily incompatible with studying the benefits of a program in which 
researchers have a vested interest208—in particular, an interest in demonstrating 
                                                     
207 See Byrne, et al., supra note 39, at 379 (“[This] intervention consisted of weekly 
visits by a Nurse Practitioner . . . incorporating anticipatory guidance regarding infant 
development, responsive parenting, maternal life goals, and maternal coping with reentry 
issues using . . . interactive communication responsive to mothers’ expressed concerns” as 
well as feedback to the mothers on their interactions with their children.); id. at 387 (“[O]ur 
NP interventionists provided individualized visits and follow-up contacts with tailored 
content focusing on specific moments of maternal-infant behavior, fostering each mother’s 
sensitivity to infant development, and encouraging reflective narration about the child as a 
unique person.”); see also id. at 388 (conceding that her research could not distinguish any 
positive effects of her team’s therapeutic intervention from effects of the prison nursery per 
se). 
208 See Karen A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: 
Proposals for a More Effective Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 15, 36 
(2003). Indeed, when the study involves human subjects, and in particular child subjects 
who are incapable of giving consent and for whom the researchers’ conclusions could have 
life-altering consequences, this self-interest of the researchers raises grave ethical concerns. 
See id.; see also 45 CFR § 46.111(b) (requiring additional protection for the rights and 
welfare of human subjects who are children or other nonautonomous persons). Relying on 
consent from the children’s mothers only exacerbates the concern in this context because 
the mothers also have a conflict of interests with the children, standing to benefit 
personally from a positive report about the program; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The 
Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 517–18 (2007) (noting that 
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success in order to secure continued financial and institutional support for the 
program209—the Columbia study is widely cited in support of prison nurseries.210 
In a first round of study, Byrne’s team looked for indications that, upon 
reaching one year of age, babies who had been or still were in the prison were 
forming attachments with their mothers. The mothers had many of the 
characteristics noted above for the female inmate population generally, such as 
high rates of substance abuse, prior criminal histories, and having left older 
offspring behind when entering prison.211  
Although the research began with one hundred babies, the team reported 
results for only thirty.212 The team’s research report mostly avoids discussing the 
                                                     
“parental consent is central to the research community’s claims about child protection” in 
use of children as research subjects). 
209 See Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: 
Impossible Dreams and Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 141 (2001) (“The 
FDA has had regulations in place since 1998 requiring investigators to have no financial 
interests in the product and technologies they are testing.”). Columbia University had an 
institutional conflict of interest given that it benefits from grant money supporting clinical 
experiences for its students, like the School of Nursing’s program at Bedford Hills, so any 
approval it gave for this human subject research would be suspect. See Mark Barnes & 
Patrik S. Florencio, Financial Conflicts of Interest in Human Subjects Research: The 
Problem of Institutional Conflicts, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 393–94 (2002) (stating that 
there is an “assumption that institutional conflicts can influence researchers and 
institutional decision makers, including IRB members, IRB staff, and others employed by 
the institution. . . . The risk is that their professional judgment may be affected by 
institutional pressure to achieve a research end point that is favorable to the institution’s 
reputation or financial interests.”). The investigators did employ “blind coders” for the 
attachment assessments. Films of mother-child interactions were given to outside assessors 
without informing them of the research setting or hypotheses. See Byrne, et al., supra note 
39, at 381. That gives some reason for viewing the attachment observations themselves, as 
opposed to the report based on them, as unbiased. However, one way a conflict of interests 
manifests is with “improper data manipulation.” See Barnes & Florencio, supra, at 394. 
Moreover, one might want to know, whether the coders could figure out from the films or 
from the fact of being contacted by the Columbia team that the mothers and infants were in 
a therapeutic prison program operated by that team. The coding entails subjective 
judgments from observations of infants’ behavior. 
210 See, e.g., Susan Conova, Do Babies Belong in Prison?, NURSING RES. (Columbia 
U. Med. Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Feb./Mar. 2006, http://www.cumc.columbia.edu/nursing/p 
df/InVivoByrne.pdf (“The project will have a big impact on the future of these 
nurseries. . . . When Dr. Byrne’s study ends next year, other prison systems will have 
enough information on child development to make decision about opening their own 
nurseries.”). 
211 See Borelli et al., supra note 39, at 356 (“Prison nursery residents have histories 
that are similar to women in the general prison population.”); id. at 360 (noting that 48% of 
the mothers “had between one and eight previous children”); Byrne et al., supra note 151, 
at 81–82. 
212 Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379. 
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fate of the other seventy children. Figuring out what happened to them requires 
piecing together bits of information scattered throughout the team’s publications.  
The team conducted attachment assessments for an additional twelve children 
(forty-two altogether)213 yet nowhere reported what they found with those other 
twelve. The explanations given for excluding those twelve suggest the results were 
poor.214 Among the remaining fifty-eight infants, at least twenty-two experienced 
disruption of their relationship with their mothers while they were still in prison, 
because of disciplinary action or the mother’s choices, presumably before their 
first birthday (when the attachment assessment would have been done).215 Those 
twenty-two children who experienced disruption include fourteen whom prison 
authorities ejected from the nursery unit, causing an immediate and possibly 
traumatic separation of infant from mother.216 The twenty-two also include three 
who separated from their mothers because the mothers decided after a while in the 
program that they did not want to continue and returned to the general prison 
population, and another five mothers who elected to transfer to a “boot camp drug 
treatment.”217 Presumably, these twenty-two babies were abruptly transferred to 
                                                     
213 Id.  
214 The ostensible reasons for excluding them were (1) that for some there was no 
corresponding assessment of the mother’s own attachment status vis-à-vis her parents, and 
the team wanted to compare each baby’s attachment status with that of his or her mother, 
and (2) that the child was no longer with the mother at the time of assessment. Id. at 379, 
388. But neither of those explanations suffices as justification for concealing the results for 
this significant number of children for whom attachment was assessed, especially given the 
broad claims Byrne ultimately made about positive outcomes for children from spending 
time in the prisons. See infra notes 232, 258–265 and accompanying text. Further, both 
reasons raise suspicion that the success rate was poor for those children; whatever gives 
rise to a mother not completing an assessment herself could be problematic for attachment, 
and being separated from the mother obviously presents a problem for becoming attached 
to her. The Author asked Byrne by email what the secure attachment rate was for these 
twelve, but she declined to respond. 
215 See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379 (noting that of one hundred dyads, forty-two 
were given assessments, leaving fifty-eight unassessed); Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 
83–84, 86 (noting that three mothers were separated by maternal request, five mothers were 
separated due to the mother’s choice to transfer to boot camp drug treatment options, and 
the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) 
separated fourteen mothers for disciplinary reasons). It is actually unclear whether all of 
these twenty-two were among the fifty-eight who never had an attachment assessment; the 
twelve assessments on which the team did not report included some children who had 
separated from their mothers. Compare Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379 (noting that of 
one hundred dyads, forty-two were given assessments, leaving fifty-eight unassessed), with 
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–84 (noting that a total of twenty-two mothers were 
separated because of disciplinary action or the mother’s choices, but not whether they had 
been assessed). 
216 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 84, 86. 
217 Id. at 83–84. A study of Ohio’s prison nursery similarly showed that nearly 20% of 
women who entered the nursery were either ejected or chose to exit from it before their 
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someone in the outside community, likely someone with whom they had little or 
no prior contact and for whom care of the infant was a substantial burden.218 
For these twenty-two children who were suddenly separated from their birth 
mothers, it seems reasonable to suppose that the rate of secure attachment to the 
birth mother was near zero.219 In addition, one baby died after contracting a 
respiratory infection in the prison.220 Thus, the team actually knew or could readily 
infer the attachment outcomes for as many as sixty-five infants (forty-two for 
whom attachment was assessed plus twenty-three who separated from the birth 
mother before the first birthday) on their first birthday, but nevertheless reported 
and drew policy conclusions on the basis of results for only thirty infants.221 For 
the additional thirty-five, the rate of secure attachment to birth mother was likely 
close to zero. 
The fate of the remaining infants (those not assessed but not removed from 
the program while the mother was still incarcerated) is difficult to discern from the 
study reports. Some (the researchers do not reveal how many) left with their 
mothers before their first birthday but were separated from the mothers soon 
thereafter, and for them the rate of secure attachment to birth mother was likely 
also zero or close to zero, because of that separation.222 Five mothers were 
deported at the end of their prison sentences, and it appears that only two of their 
babies left the country with them at that time, so three of these mothers separated 
from their children, possibly permanently.223 An additional undisclosed number of 
infants could not be assessed because they had not yet progressed to the stage of 
physical development at which it is possible to do an attachment assessment.224 
                                                     
release dates, causing their babies to experience a disruption. See MAWHORR, supra note 
42, at 7. 
218 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 85–86; see also Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, 
at 97 (“Kinship caregivers . . . faced similar struggles to research participation . . . most 
notably poverty, housing instability, and personal histories of criminal justice involvement, 
mental illness, and/or substance abuse.”). 
219 See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 86 (only a few of the twenty-two ever reunited 
with their birth mothers after their releases from prison). 
220 Id. at 83. The infant’s mother sued the prison for providing inadequate medical 
care to her son. Robin Hindery, Mothering Behind Bars: Prison Nurseries Have Noble 
Goals but Mixed Results, YOUTH MATTERS (May 2004), http://web.jrn.columbia.edu/stude 
ntwork/youthmatters/2004/just_2_hindery.asp. 
221 Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379. 
222 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83; see also Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379, 
389. Even among those infants who were still with their mother in the community on their 
first birthday, and for whom Byrne’s team did report attachment results, most did not form 
a secure attachment to the mother. See Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379, 382 (reporting 
that only six out of fourteen infants in this subcategory showed signs of secure attachment). 
223 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 84. 
224 Email from Mary Woods Byrne, Professor, Columbia University, Dir., Ctr. for 
Children and Families, to author (Feb. 27, 2012) (on file with Author) (stating that 
independent mobility is a developmental prerequisite for conducting the Strange Situation 
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The team did not reveal the number of children for which that was true, nor did 
they discuss whether the slower rate of physical development in these children 
might itself suggest something negative about the babies’ well-beings, such as 
deficient maternal nurturing or adverse impacts of the prison environment. For an 
additional, unspecified number of infants who exited the prison with their mothers 
before reaching age one, the team lost contact with the mothers or the mothers 
lived too far away from the lab where the team was conducting the attachment 
assessments.225 The team received reports that some of these mothers had 
separated from their children or were again engaged in criminal activity that could 
lead them back to prison.226 
Thus, perhaps the most interesting part of the Bedford Hills story, and the 
most revealing of the true odds of a good outcome for a baby the state places in 
prison, is the fate of the seventy children whom the team chose not to discuss in 
their report on attachment. As stated above, what policy makers should want to 
know is the answer to this: What is the likelihood, for any given newborn child of 
an incarcerated woman, that if the state puts that baby into prison he or she will 
form a secure attachment to the mother and will not suffer separation from the 
mother thereafter (and will not be harmed by the experience of living in prison)? 
Both failing to form a secure attachment in the first place and experiencing a 
disruption or destruction of the attachment relationship after it forms or begins to 
form are seriously detrimental to a child and likely to put the child on a downward 
trajectory in life.227 
Among the thirty children on whom the team chose to focus for attachment 
purposes, they observed indications of attachment forming in eighteen babies, so 
they did document that attachment might be achievable in a prison environment.228 
Attachment “might be” achievable because the one-year point is early in the 
attachment stage of development, which is “fragile,” lengthy, and dependent on 
“contextual stability in the early years of life.”229 Subsequent adverse experiences, 
to which these children are highly vulnerable, could easily derail the attachment 
process.230 In fact, some of those eighteen were separated from their mothers 
                                                     
Procedure (“SSP”), so infants that had not reached that level of development were 
excluded). 
225 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–85. 
226 Id. at 82 (noting that the researchers received reports of “longer term separation 
patterns” among these women); Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 97, 98, 102 (reporting 
researchers’ belief that some mothers avoided contact because they were again involved in 
criminal activity). 
227 See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text. 
228 Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 382, 384 (noting that there were indications of 
secure attachment for 60% of the thirty children, totaling eighteen).  
229 Id. at 389–90. 
230 See Inge Bretherton, Parental Incarceration: The Challenges for Attachment 
Researchers, 12 ATTACHMENT & HUMAN DEV. 417, 421 (2010) (“One might conclude 
[from Byrne’s study] that the year-long in-prison intervention experience interrupted the 
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immediately after the assessment, because of New York’s one-year timeline for a 
baby’s stay in prison.231  
Despite these reasons for hesitation, and despite the omission of seventy out 
of the original one hundred children, Byrne concluded, based on the eighteen-out-
of-thirty finding, that her study “demonstrates that children raised in a prison 
nursery program exhibit measurable rates of secure attachment consistent with or 
exceeding population norms.”232 In other words, she claimed that prison babies on 
the whole do just as well in terms of attachment rate as babies who do not live in 
prisons, a claim that my deconstruction of the study above shows to be false. 
Byrne did add several caveats—namely, that thirty is a small sample,233 that testing 
conditions were constraining,234 that the attachment process might not continue to 
go well after the team’s support services ended235 or when children returned to the 
mother’s community of origin with its “multitude of environmental risks,”236 that 
the high risk of mother-child separations was cause for serious concern,237 and that 
the attachments observed might not have occurred without the research team’s 
therapeutic involvement with the mothers.238 But advocates for prison nurseries 
predictably have ignored these cautionary notes and have routinely made sweeping 
statements to the effect that this study proves prison nurseries are good for 
children.239 State commissions appointed to assess the policy desirability of prison 
                                                     
cycle of intergenerational transmission for many babies with AAI-insecure [Adult 
Attachment Interview-insecure] mothers but (given the small sample involved) I have 
reservations about making such claims before confirmatory follow-up results from this 
longitudinal study become available.”); Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 292 
(“Importantly, there is evidence that attachment quality can change over time in response to 
changes in the caregiving environment, with, for example, secure children later becoming 
insecure in response to new family adversities.”). 
231 See supra notes 166–168. 
232 Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 280. 
233 Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 388. 
234 Id. at 388–89. 
235 Id. at 389. 
236 Id. at 390. 
237 Id. at 389. 
238 Id. at 387–88; see also Bretherton, supra note 230, at 422 (hypothesizing “that the 
weekly one-on-one interactions with the nurse practitioner who functioned as a therapeutic 
secure base may have been the most efficacious aspect of the Bedford Hills intervention”). 
239 See, e.g., DIAMOND & ORWISH-GROSS, supra note 81, at 4 (claiming that Byrne’s 
study showed that “71% of infants who lived with their mothers in a prison nursery, 
developed secure attachment”); Sarah Abramowicz, A Family Law Perspective on Parental 
Incarceration, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 228, 234–35 (2012) (stating that Byrne’s study 
demonstrates “healthier infant development, in addition to reducing recidivism on the part 
of mothers”); Carlson, supra note 47, at 17 (citing the Columbia research and asserting, 
“This data is strong evidence that nursery program[s] promote bonding”); Press Release, 
Women’s Prison Ass’n, supra note 81, available at http://www.corrections.com/articles/21 
644-prison-nursery-programs-a-growing-trend-in-women-s-prisons (claiming that Byrne’s 
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nurseries repeat these claims that falsely suggest the programs are a success for all 
or nearly all babies in them, and legislators do not question these assertions 
because no opposing constituency prods them to do so.240  
Yet Byrne’s research actually supports a very negative conclusion. Adding to 
the calculations of attachment rate the twenty-two babies241 who separated from 
their mothers while in prison before age one (fourteen because prison officials 
ejected the mother, eight because the mothers chose to exit), who undoubtedly did 
not form a secure attachment to their birth mothers, changes the rate of secure 
attachment to 35% (eighteen out of fifty-two), which is similar to the poor rates of 
secure attachment for infants in the community whose mothers are incarcerated.242 
Taking into account also that some of those eighteen who showed signs of secure 
attachment suffered separation from their mothers immediately after the 
assessment,243 that many more infants left prison with their mothers but separated 
soon thereafter, and that the results were likely poor for the twelve additional 
babies who were assessed but excluded from the calculations, the rate of secure 
attachment among the one hundred babies originally enrolled in the study must 
actually be well below even the very poor rate for children who remain in the 
community while their mothers are in prison. And that is what policy makers 
should want to know. 
Moreover, even for the small percentage of prison babies who do develop 
secure attachments to their mothers, the long-term prospects would be poor. The 
enormous challenges facing the mothers on reentry create a high likelihood of 
maltreatment and disruption of the attachment relationship.244 Follow-up research 
                                                     
research “indicates that these programs benefit mothers and children”); Kusmer, supra note 
30 (“[S]tudies show the children benefit from the contact, said Mary Byrne . . . . The babies 
born to mothers in prisons generally are better off staying there with them, she said. The 
outcomes are promising . . . .”). 
240 See, e.g., CONN. DEP’T OF CORR., PRISON NURSERY FEASIBILITY REPORT 3–4, 27 
(2013) (concluding that prison nurseries foster the early child bonding that results in 
positive future outcomes for both mother and child, and not mentioning any opposition to 
these programs.). 
241 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83–84. 
242 Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 376–77; Murray & Murray, supra note 72, at 292. 
243 Ten of the children who were still in the nursery upon reaching age one had to exit 
the prison on their first birthdays while the mothers remained, but it is not clear what 
overlap there is between those ten and the eighteen with secure attachment indicators. 
Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83; see also Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 379–85 (noting 
that the average stay in prison for those mothers whose babies “aged out” of the program at 
one year of age was 36.3 months, meaning mothers remained in prison on average two 
years after their babies left); id. at 389 (“Typical celebrations of the first birthday in this 
study setting are poignant when followed by infant-mother separation . . . .”). 
244 See Failinger, supra note 83, at 500 (“[W]omen offenders frequently take out the 
rage that they have suppressed from their own childhood experiences on their children, or 
neglect or abandon their children as they descend into the hopeless vortex of drugs and 
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that Byrne’s team conducted confirms the danger of developmentally damaging 
disruption.245 In addition to continuing to provide services to the study participants 
after release, the team recorded the participants’ statuses one year after reentry and 
again two years later. The team found at three years after reentry that only twenty-
four of the original one hundred children had remained continuously in the care of 
their mothers246 and that most of the children were not in their mother’s custody at 
that point. 247 
What explains this high rate of separation? In addition to the twenty-two 
children who were separated from their mothers while in prison because of 
disciplinary action or the mothers’ choice, as well as the ten who were separated 
immediately upon turning one because their mothers had more than six months left 
to serve, many others experienced separation from their mothers even though they 
left prison at the same time as their mothers. Some separations were temporary, but 
even those can be traumatic and disrupt a child’s psycho-emotional 
development.248 Others were prolonged and possibly permanent. At least eighteen 
mothers returned to prison because of criminal recidivism,249 and an unspecified 
number had drug relapses after release.250 Moreover, even among the forty-four 
women who were primary caretakers of their children at three years after 
reentry,251 undoubtedly some subsequently separated from the children—the team 
learned that some of them were involved in criminal activity, substance abuse, or 
other parole violations.252 
Even among the 24% of children who remained continuously with their 
mothers through the three-year mark after reentry, the rate of secure attachment 
was likely around half.253 Thus, judging from this one longitudinal study of one 
                                                     
crime.”); Roberts, supra note 19, at 1499 (“[T]he post-prison collateral penalties make it 
difficult [for released mothers] to maintain a relationship with their children.”). 
245 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 87. 
246 Of these twenty-four children, eight were separated from their mothers for periods 
of time. Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83.  
247 Id.; see also Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 102 (indicating worse results 
would have been likely without the post-release nurse visits). 
248 See Goldsmith et al., supra note 134, at 6 (“[A]ny separation, particularly if long 
and abrupt, will evoke strong and painful emotional reactions.”).  
249 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 83.  
250 Id. at 84. 
251 Id. at 83. 
252 See Goshin & Byrne, supra note 118, at 102. Byrne did not include these women 
in her reports of recidivism or of return to prison. See id. 
253 The team did not conduct attachment assessments in the follow-up studies nor 
report what overlap there was between the attachment assessments at the one-year mark 
and the twenty-four children who remained continuously with their mothers, so one can 
only make a reasonable estimate based on other information. These twenty-four children 
would not have included the ten who were still with their mothers and in prison on their 
first birthdays but who then had to leave the prison while their mothers stayed behind. It 
might include the other six children who were still in prison on their first birthdays, and for 
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hundred prison babies, conducted by a team that had attitudinal and institutional 
motivations to find positive results, the percentage of mother-child relationships 
that fulfill the ideal envisioned by prison nursery proponents (secure attachment 
and continuous maternal care thereafter) appears to be 10 to 15%. The conclusion 
Byrne’s research actually, objectively yields, then, is this: it is possible for the 
prison nursery ideal to be realized, but it is very unlikely, and for the great majority 
of babies whom states are putting in prisons, the ultimate outcome will entail 
attachment failure or disruption; separation from the mothers; and, consequently, 
later lives marred by the same dysfunctions their mothers had.  
It is difficult to understand why the high rate of separation is not the main 
story the research team tells and why it does not lead Byrne and her team to advise 
against continuation of this experiment with children’s lives unless and until states 
figure out how to prevent separations. Byrne herself writes, 
 
The overwhelming conclusion of existing research in psychology, 
psychiatry, and child development is that abrupt separation from a 
primary caregiver before 18 months of age has lifelong effects on a 
person’s ability to establish healthy relationships and interact in a 
positive way with the world. . . . Children who are separated from their 
primary caregivers during this period learn that they cannot depend on 
others to care for them and that the world is an unpredictable and 
frightening place. It is well established that frightening experiences early 
in life can lead to disorganization even in an established attachment. 
Neurochemical studies show that disruptions to the attachment process 
affect the growth and development of the brain, as well as social 
functioning, aggressiveness, reaction to stress, and risk for substance 
abuse during adulthood.254 
 
Byrne’s published reports of her research could give readers the impression 
that she approached her studies as an advocate for women prisoners and prison 
nurseries rather than as a disinterested social scientist.255 Despite her acknow-
                                                     
them we might reasonably assume four were securely attached. The remaining eighteen 
children who continuously lived with their mothers from birth to three years after reentry 
most likely left with their mothers before reaching age one. Among the fourteen children in 
that category for whom the team reported results, only six showed signs of secure 
attachment, a rate of 43%. Extrapolating from the fourteen to the eighteen, 43% of 18 is 
7.7, so let us assume eight children. Eight and four make twelve, or half of the twenty-four. 
Without more complete disclosure from the research team, it is not possible to confirm the 
accuracy of this estimate. 
254 Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 86–87 (citations omitted). 
255 By “advocate for,” I do not mean occupy a role designated for advocacy, but rather 
simply someone who advocates for. It is worth noting, though, that one of Byrne’s official 
roles has been supervisor of the clinical program at Columbia University School of Nursing 
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ledgement that the recidivism studies are “specious,”256 she frequently suggests to 
readers that policy makers should support prison nurseries because they reduce 
recidivism.257 And despite her own numerous cautions about interpreting the 
attachment results that she chose to report, Byrne frequently makes sweepingly 
positive assertions about the research in a way that appears designed to convince 
readers of the desirability of putting babies in prison: “Evidence that secure 
attachment actually does occur in US prison nursery settings provides a strong 
argument for their effectiveness” and “these programs are effective for the women 
and child participants and are reasonably efficient, but provide access to a small 
number of those in need. Limited access is a constraint to the potential widespread 
effectiveness of this policy solution.”258 A reasonable reader could conclude from 
these assertions that all or nearly all children in prison nurseries realize “positive 
developmental outcomes” and do so because of the prison nurseries,259 yet that is 
patently false.260 
                                                     
through which her students provide services to the inmate mothers. See Melanie A. Farmer, 
Behind Bars: Supporting Mothers in Prison, COLUMBIA U. REC., Nov. 23, 2009, at 4. 
256 Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 276.  
257 See id. at 276 (“Decreased recidivism after release from a nursery program is 
currently the positive outcome with the most empirical support . . . . Decreased maternal 
recidivism is an undoubtedly positive outcome for children as well as their mothers.”); see 
also id. at 289 (“The evidence linking prison nursery participation to large reductions in 
recidivism makes them politically viable.”). 
258 Id. at 288; see also Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 79 (stating that the team’s 
research results “provide evidence of positive infant, toddler, and post-release preschool 
outcomes” for “children who resided in a U.S. prison nursery”); Goshin & Byrne, supra 
note 35, at 287 (“Contact between incarcerated parents and their children is important.”); 
id. at 280 (arguing that prison nurseries are economically efficient for the state); id. at 289 
(“The current conservative approach of admitting only low risk mothers may be unrealistic 
if departments wish to reach more women and children . . . . Prison nursery programs are a 
creative, gender-responsive strategy with the potential to positively affect both incarcerated 
women and their infant children.”); id. at 290 (“[P]rison nurseries are a preferred 
intervention for policy makers wishing to provide a cohabitation intervention for the 
incarcerated mothers with infant children under their jurisdiction . . . . Positive 
developmental outcomes for infants who co-resided with their mothers in a US prison 
nursery have only recently been documented and provide renewed incentive for co-
residence while ameliorating one of the most common concerns.”); Goshin & Byrne, supra 
note 118, at 95 (“Parenting interventions that allow women to co-reside with their young 
children . . . further extend the potential benefits to the next generation.”). I focus here on 
Byrne’s own publications. She is sometimes quoted in news stories speaking in even 
stronger advocacy terms, but these might be misquotes. See, e.g., Conova, supra note 210 
(“To answer the real question ‘do the babies belong in the prison with their mothers?’—the 
answer, so far, seems to be yes.”).  
259 Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 290. Byrne also makes misleading statements 
about the law governing the prison program, falsely suggesting that courts have ordered 
prison officials not to place a child in prison unless and until they conclude that doing so is 
in that particular child’s best interests. See Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 81 (“[T]he ‘best 
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A more objective conclusion from this one study that has been done on the 
child welfare impact of prison nurseries in the United States is this: imprisoning 
babies with their mothers is a reckless gamble that harms the great majority of 
them by tethering the children psycho-emotionally to women who are not capable 
of giving a baby the nurturing needed for secure attachment or serving as 
consistent long-term caregivers. For the great majority of children, the programs 
are a failure likely to cause lifelong adverse consequences. What is most 
disheartening from a child welfare perspective is how advocates downplay or 
simply ignore this reality, determined to continue the practice for the sake of the 
adults whose suffering appears to be their primary concern. 
 
IV.  LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN IN PRISON 
 
Part II showed that prison is not a healthy environment for children; it is 
highly unlikely children will attach to their incarcerated mothers even when forced 
to live with them in prison; if attachment with an incarcerated mother does occur, 
there is great risk it will be disrupted; and immediately placing babies born to 
                                                     
interest of the child’ standard applied to community custody cases must also be used to 
determine whether a pregnant inmate could keep her child . . . . [C]orrectional authorities 
are duty-bound to apply [the best interest] standard when making decisions.”). In fact, the 
court decisions she cited to support these assertions (1) were local court decisions 
governing only counties that do not include Bedford Hills, and (2) simply held that 
incarcerated mothers can challenge an exclusion of their child from the program on the 
grounds that prison officials failed to consider whether placement in the prison might be 
consistent with the child’s welfare. See Bailey v. Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1979) (holding that a sheriff did not abuse his discretion in declining, based on his 
assessment of the child’s welfare, a mother’s request to have her baby placed in county jail 
with her); Apgar v. Beauter, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that a sheriff 
improperly denied a jailed mother’s request to place her baby in jail with her because he 
did not have sufficient reason to believe this would be contrary to the child’s welfare). 
260 At other times, Byrne writes in somewhat more measured terms of attachment 
rates, but she still claims too much. She asserts that “this study provides the first evidence 
that mothers in a prison nursery setting can raise infants who are securely attached to them 
at rates comparable to healthy community children.” Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 375; see 
also Byrne et al., supra note 151, at 80 (characterizing the attachment success as 
“striking”). She claims that her research “demonstrates that children raised in a prison 
nursery program exhibit measurable rates of secure attachment consistent with or 
exceeding population norms.” Goshin & Byrne, supra note 35, at 280. And she states that 
her study showed babies of “imprisoned pregnant women” achieved attachment “at very 
high levels.” Byrne et al., supra note 48, at 27. Her findings do not support even these 
assertions because they pertain only to a carefully culled subset of mothers and infants and 
only at an early point in the attachment stage of development. To assert that the rate of 
secure attachment with “mothers in a prison nursery,” with “imprisoned pregnant women,” 
or for “children raised in a prison nursery” ultimately is that reflected in that subset at that 
point in time is grossly misleading at best.  
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inmates for adoption gives them a far better chance for a healthy and fulfilling life. 
Prison nurseries are therefore patently unjustifiable on child welfare grounds. Are 
they also unlawful? 
Remarkably, no one has asked this question before now. Scholars concerned 
about incarceration of parents routinely argue in favor of greater substantive and 
procedural protection for those parents as a matter of constitutional entitlement,261 
but they have nothing to say about what rights the Constitution might confer on 
children in connection with the state’s placing them in prisons. 
This Part considers both constitutional and statutory limitations on placement 
of children in prisons. For this first-ever analysis of the question, it affords helpful 
simplicity to confine consideration to the extreme case of prison nurseries. This 
Part examines the legality of this practice from two perspectives—first viewing it 
as a state decision to place babies in prison and second as a state decision to 
authorize incarcerated parents to place their children into prison. 
Regardless of how one views the situation, for children to spend any amount 
of time in prison, there must be some state action that plays a causal role. At some 
point, some state officials—whether prison wardens, department of corrections 
officials, social service agency employees, legislators, or governors—must decide 
that it will happen and, accordingly, either transfer a child in state custody to a 
prison or confer on parents or other adults the legal power to bring children into 
prisons and keep or leave them there. Such government decision making must be 
subject to legal limits even if some private party also plays a role. Clearly, if the 
state said that children of inmates must live in the prison with them, we would 
recognize a potential constitutional violation. Likewise, if a state decided to put 
abandoned children into prisons to live with unrelated inmates at the request of 
those inmates and in the hope that this would reduce recidivism, it would certainly 
be subject to legal challenge. And if legislatures authorized placement of mentally 
disabled adults in prisons to live with incarcerated relatives who so request, 
advocates for disabled persons would undoubtedly challenge its legality. 
 
A.  May the State Place Infants in Prison? 
 
State placement of infants in prison can be viewed as analogous to a state 
decision to remove a free person from the community and sentence him to a prison 
term or civilly commit him to a secure psychiatric facility. This is so regardless of 
how much nicer a nursery unit is than the rest of the prison; if an entire prison were 
just like the nicest existing prison nursery, in terms of accommodations and 
decorations, only without babies, no one would deny that it is still a prison.262 And 
                                                     
261 See, e.g., Caitlin Mitchell, Family Integrity and Incarcerated Parents: Bridging 
the Divide, 24 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 175, 193 (2012) (“Understanding family integrity as 
a substantive due process right is important because it suggests that a high standard should 
be used when evaluating federal and state law that terminates parental rights.”). 
262 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (“It is of no constitutional consequence—
and of limited practical meaning—that the institution to which he is committed is called an 
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there are, of course, constitutional limits on the state’s power to hold people in 
prison or other state institutions. These limits arise from individuals’ right to 
liberty and bodily integrity, and they have substantive and procedural aspects. 
After describing general constitutional limits and rights, this section considers 
whether these apply in the case of nonautonomous persons and, if so, whether the 
unique situation of parental incarceration warrants creating a special exception to 
normal constitutional rules. Lastly, it addresses the implications of federal and 
state statutes that prohibit housing minors in adult prisons. 
 
1.  General Substantive and Procedural Constitutional Limits  
 
As a general matter, the state may not order individuals into detention 
facilities unless it has either (a) charged them with a crime and determined on an 
individualized basis that they pose a flight risk or a danger to the community that 
can only be addressed by detention,263 or (b) found in an adversary hearing that 
they for some other reason pose a danger to themselves or others that makes 
detention necessary.264 “In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”265 It is, in fact, “the most 
elemental of liberty interests—the interest in being free from physical detention by 
                                                     
Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a ‘receiving 
home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the 
child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes ‘a building with 
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours’ . . . peopled by guards, 
custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’ confined with him for anything from 
waywardness to rape and homicide.” (citations omitted)). 
263 See, e.g., United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 720 (1990) (holding 
that a pretrial detainee may be confined to ensure his presence at trial or in “recognition 
[of] the danger [such] a person may pose to others if released” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-
225, at 3)); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding the Bail Reform 
Act of 1984 constitutional because it “authorizes the detention prior to trial of arrestees 
charged with serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to 
the safety of individuals or to the community which no condition of release can dispel” 
(emphasis added)). 
264 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426–27 (1979) (holding “that due process 
requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence”); see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992) 
(holding violative of due process a state statute authorizing detention of a person acquitted 
due to insanity, because under it such person was not “entitled to an adversary hearing at 
which the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is demonstrably 
dangerous to the community”); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731–39 (1972) (holding 
indefinite detention of persons found incompetent to stand trial unconstitutional absent 
finding of dangerousness. “Without a finding of dangerousness, one committed thereunder 
can be held only for a ‘reasonable period of time’ necessary to determine whether there is a 
substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future.”). 
265 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.  
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one’s own government.”266 Incarceration is “the most common and one of the most 
feared instruments of state oppression and state indifference.”267 
Under the existing Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine and the 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process doctrine, an aim of simply 
improving someone’s welfare is patently insufficient to justify infringing liberty by 
putting that person in prison, as is an aim of trying to influence the behavior of 
other private parties.268 Many people now living in free society might be better off 
if the state put them in prison for a while, but the state may not do so for that 
reason alone. Even the aim of protecting individuals from harm by other persons is 
insufficient justification for the state to seize persons and place them in prison. 
Thus, the state may not arrest and imprison victims of domestic violence to protect 
them from further abuse.269 Presumably, it would not be constitutionally 
permissible for the state to react to reports of pervasive abuse in nursing homes by 
ordering that elderly persons be housed in prisons instead, even though the state 
might better supervise their treatment there. 
Children of incarcerated parents do not fall into either of the articulated 
exceptions to the general constitutional prohibitions against state confinement of 
persons in correctional facilities. They have committed no crime, and they do not 
pose a danger to themselves or others. Thus, prison nurseries presumptively violate 
those substantive prohibitions. 
The state is also subject to substantive constitutional limitations when it 
initiates a civil commitment action against mentally ill or mentally disabled 
persons; “[C]ivil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation 
of liberty that requires due process protection.”270 The Supreme Court has 
established that mere deficiency of reason is not sufficient cause for committing a 
person to an institution.271 Even when a mental deficit is clear, “there is still no 
constitutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous 
to no one and can live safely in freedom.”272 Thus, it is clearly insufficient under 
civil commitment doctrine that a person might be better off if institutionalized: 
  
                                                     
266 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
267 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
268 I do not consider Eighth Amendment doctrine because it applies only following a 
criminal conviction. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 64 (1977) (“An examination of the 
history of the Amendment and decisions of this Court construing the proscription against 
cruel and usual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect those convicted of 
crimes.”). Further, as a descriptive matter, placement of babies in prison nurseries cannot 
fairly be characterized as punishment. 
269 My research assistants searched in vain for reported instances of this occurring. 
270 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). 
271 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (“‘[M]ental illness’ alone 
cannot justify a state’s locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in 
simple custodial confinement.”). 
272 Id.  
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[T]o commit an individual to a mental institution in a civil proceeding, 
the State is required by the Due Process Clause to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence . . . that the person sought to be committed is 
mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization for his own welfare and 
the protection of others.273  
 
Indeed, even if a mentally ill person has committed a crime but is found not 
guilty by reason of insanity, the state may confine him only so long as he poses a 
danger to others.274 That justification cannot plausibly be invoked to support state 
placement of infants in prison. Thus, even if civil commitment doctrine applied 
rather than doctrine relating to incarceration, prison nurseries presumptively 
violate children’s substantive constitutional rights. 
In addition to substantive limitations on state placement of persons in 
detention facilities or psychiatric hospitals, there are constitutionally mandated 
procedural requirements. These are no minor detail; they are crucial for ensuring 
that state actors do not run roughshod over individuals’ rights, especially those of 
vulnerable individuals who cannot complain, and that state decision making that 
impacts persons’ basic welfare is rational and objective as well as respectful of 
rights.275 First, such state action requires “clear and unquestionable authority of 
law.”276 Prison officials in Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington are violating this 
mandate by placing babies in prisons despite the absence of any statute authorizing 
the practice. Second, the state action may occur only after a procedurally regular, 
individualized adjudication of its appropriateness.277 Ordinarily the state places 
someone in prison for a definite term, such as eighteen months or three years, only 
after finding that person committed a crime; to do so, the state must conduct an 
                                                     
273 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1992) (emphasis added). 
274 Id. at 76–77; see also O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575–76 (holding that “a State cannot 
constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of 
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family 
members or friends”). 
275 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1967) (“Due process of law is the primary and 
indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the 
social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the 
state may exercise. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said: ‘The history of American freedom 
is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.’ But in addition, the procedural rules 
which have been fashioned from the generality of due process are our best instruments for 
the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life 
and our adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process which enhance 
the possibility that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions and 
conflicting data. ‘Procedure is to law what ‘scientific method’ is to science.’”). 
276 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
277 See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (recognizing that “the 
detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to 
furnish meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty”). 
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individualized hearing, in which the person in question has independent legal 
representation, and satisfy the high evidentiary burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.278 Civil commitment similarly requires an individualized 
determination of necessity, based on clear and convincing evidence.279 Yet in none 
of the existing nursery programs does any competent authority, prior to ordering a 
child’s imprisonment, decide the best choice for a child with an incarcerated 
mother—among all alternatives available—through individualized determination, 
let alone through finding by clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a particular child needs to be in prison to avoid imminent 
danger of substantial harm. Moreover, whereas a mother might be able to appeal a 
decision excluding her from the nursery,280 there is no mechanism for appealing on 
behalf of the child a decision to put him or her in prison; a prison warden’s 
decision to put a baby in prison is unreviewable. States are placing children in 
prison for months or years without any formal and transparent process and without 
independent representation for the children—an obvious violation of children’s 
right to procedural due process.281 That this processless incarceration is happening 
primarily to minority-race children makes it especially troubling.282  
 
2.  Do Infants Have “Liberty” Interests? 
 
Doctrine establishing rights against confinement has developed in contexts 
involving persons capable of experiencing confinement as a deprivation, and the 
Supreme Court has predicated these rights largely on the individual interest in 
liberty. A pertinent question is whether infants have the capacity for that 
experience or have a sufficient liberty interest such that it is fitting to extend the 
doctrine to them. 
The Supreme Court has typically spoken in general terms of all persons 
having constitutionally protected interests in liberty, rather than in more limited 
terms of just autonomous persons having such an interest. For example, in Terry v. 
                                                     
278 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–72 n.40 (1977) (“[T]he State 
does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until 
after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”). 
279 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75–76, 81. 
280 See Haverty, supra note 52, at 3 (reporting a statement by a prison official at 
Bedford Hills that there is an appeals process for the mothers). 
281 In some programs, there might be a committee that reviews each application that 
any woman submits, but the committee does not include a child welfare expert and is not 
addressed by an independent advocate for the child whose fate is being decided. See, e.g., 
NEB. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., supra note 40, at 3 (naming as decision makers the prison 
warden and a committee consisting of the assistant warden, a mental health staff person, a 
parenting program coordinator, and the substance abuse unit supervisor). 
282 Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004) (observing that “an unchecked 
system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression”).  
2014] JAILING BLACK BABIES 523 
 
Ohio,283 the Court pronounced, “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession 
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others.”284 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,285 the Court reaffirmed “the fundamental nature of a 
citizen’s right to be free from involuntary confinement by his own government.”286 
In fact, the Court has explicitly extended substantive and procedural due process 
rights to children.287  
However, the Court has also stated on occasion that it views minors’ liberty 
interests as weaker than those of adults, simply because children must always be in 
someone’s custody and are never fully in control of their own lives and persons 
anyway. In Schall v. Martin,288 for example, the Court upheld a statute authorizing 
preadjudication detention of juveniles charged with delinquency, reasoning that 
although a “juvenile’s countervailing interest in freedom from institutional 
restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly substantial as 
well . . . that interest must be qualified by the recognition that juveniles, unlike 
adults, are always in some form of custody. Children, by definition, are not 
assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves.”289 Whatever truth this 
assertion has as to teenagers, it is even more true of infants; they are appropriately 
always in someone’s custody. 
But as this passage suggests, the Court has not stated that any minors have no 
constitutionally protected liberty interests at all; though more limited, minors’ 
liberty interests are still “substantial.” Indeed, some Supreme Court Justices have 
taken the position that minors have liberty interests equal to those of adults, 
interests the state must justify infringing even when it places minors in a homelike 
setting. Concurring in Reno v. Flores,290 which upheld a federal immigration 
policy of holding unaccompanied alien children in state custody pending 
deportation if no parent was available to assume custody, Justices O’Connor and 
Souter wrote the following: 
 
“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental 
                                                     
283 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
284 Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 
251 (1891)). 
285 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
286 Id. at 531 (emphasis added). 
287 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 601–02 (1979) (holding that “a child has a 
protectible interest not only in being free of unnecessary bodily restrains but also in not 
being labeled erroneously”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367–68 (1970) (holding that 
there is a right to an evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in delinquency 
proceedings). 
288 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
289 Id. at 265 (citation omitted). 
290 507 U.S. 292 (1993). 
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action.” “Freedom from bodily restraint” means more than freedom from 
handcuffs, straitjackets, or detention cells. A person’s core liberty 
interests are also implicated when she is confined in a prison, a mental 
hospital, or some other form of custodial institution, even if the 
conditions of confinement are liberal. This is clear beyond cavil, at least 
where adults are concerned. . . .  
Children, too, have a core liberty interest in remaining free from 
institutional confinement. In this respect, a child’s constitutional 
“[f]reedom from bodily restraint” is no narrower than an adult’s. 
Beginning with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), we consistently have 
rejected the assertion that “a child, unlike an adult, has a right not to 
liberty but to custody.” . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Institutionalization is a decisive and unusual event. “The 
consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more tragic 
where children are involved. [C]hildhood is a particularly vulnerable 
time of life and children erroneously institutionalized during their 
formative years may bear the scars for the rest of their lives.”291 
 
Moreover, as an empirical matter, infants are unquestionably affected 
physically and psychologically by their environment and have interests threatened 
by imprisonment that are properly viewed as liberty interests. Recall the 
description of prison presented by child development experts, quoted in Part II, 
which emphasized the “spatial shrinking,” “strict temporal constraints,” “[s]ocial 
deprivation,” “surveillance,” and inhibition of “the child’s autonomization 
process.”292 Babies undoubtedly experience prison differently than do adults or 
teenagers, but they likely also experience it as a confining and oppressive 
environment and are adversely affected by the authoritarian control, severely 
limited space shared with many people, regimentation, pervasive tension, and 
deprivation of innumerable ordinary experiences, including contact with men and 
most of the natural world.293 In fact, babies might incur greater harm from time in 
prison than do adults or teenagers, because infancy is a time of intense brain 
development, physical growth, and vulnerability.294 The psychological, physical, 
                                                     
291 Id. at 315–18 (O’Connor, J. and Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
292 Jaffé et al., supra note 135, at 402–04. 
293 See Hindery, supra note 220 (relating a former prison mother’s ambivalence about 
her son’s stay with her in New York’s program, citing the regimentation, spread of 
infectious diseases, and lack of normal infant experiences). 
294 See Evelyn Wotherspoon et al., Neglected Infants in Family Court, 48 FAM. CT. 
REV. 505, 506 (2010). 
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social, and developmental interests babies have that are thwarted in a unique way 
by imprisonment are fairly characterized as liberty interests.295  
Even if infants’ liberty interests are deemed weaker than those of adults, there 
is reason to be just as protective of them—namely, that infants are unable to object 
to unwarranted incursions. It is too easy for adults to use children instrumentally to 
serve adults’ interests—in particular, when the child’s legal parents have interests 
contrary to those of the child. The primary motivation prison officials have had for 
instituting prison nursery programs is one that might also lead them to institute 
pets-in-prison programs—that is, the supposition that it has some positive 
rehabilitative effect on the prisoners, which might in turn benefit prison operators 
and the rest of society by reducing recidivism and therefore the prison 
population.296 The primary motivation of prisoners’ advocates, the initiating force 
behind these programs, is to alleviate prisoners’ suffering, just as a pets-in-prison 
program might do. It is essential, if children and their liberty interests are to 
receive respect and protection, that courts review these programs rigorously and 
demand, at a minimum, before the state places any child in an adult prison, an 
individualized finding based on at least clear and convincing evidence that 
imprisonment is necessary to avoid danger of substantial harm to that child, taking 
into account all available alternatives to imprisonment. 
A state, therefore, could not plausibly defend placement of babies in prison 
against constitutional challenges by asserting that babies have no interest in 
liberty—no interest in not being confined to a state correction facility. The relevant 
question is what state justification could suffice for infringing that liberty by 
placing a child in prison. The Supreme Court has held that some justifications that 
might not pertain or suffice with competent adults do so with minors—in 
particular, paternalistic efforts to protect minors’ welfare. The Schall Court cited 
the state’s authority to protect dependent and vulnerable persons as adequate 
justification for brief pretrial detention, stating that “if parental control falters, the 
State must play its part as parens patriae. In this respect, the juvenile’s liberty 
interests may, in appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State’s ‘parens 
patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.’”297 Certainly 
the state and private parties are justified in constraining the freedom of very young 
children in some ways just to promote their welfare, and they need not always 
demonstrate that this is necessary or the least restrictive means of benefiting the 
child. 
Nevertheless, with prison nurseries, long-term imprisonment is at issue—not a 
temporary detention pending a hearing, not residential placement in a home 
environment as with foster care or kin guardianship, and not compulsory school 
                                                     
295 Cf. Mendez v. Rutherford, 655 F. Supp. 115, 120 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that a 
complaint on behalf of a three-year-old child stated a cognizable substantive due process 
claim for damages against a police department for trauma from watching officers beat her 
father).  
296 See supra notes 79, 194 and accompanying text. 
297 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264–65 (1984) (citations omitted). 
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attendance. The Schall Court emphasized that in the context of detention, even in a 
facility housing only minors, not just any paternalistic justification will do; the 
justification must be proportionate to the severe deprivation that confinement in a 
prison-like facility for any period of time constitutes for anyone.298 The 
justification the government relied on was not that the juvenile might simply derive 
benefits from pretrial detention, such as by receiving counseling, but that 
temporary detention was necessary to prevent him from engaging in more criminal 
activity and thereby subjecting others and himself to danger of violence.299 There 
was a danger-to-self-and-others rationale and a necessity, as well as alleged 
criminal conduct, consistent with doctrine on pretrial detention of adults.  
Thus, any parens patriae justification for prison nurseries must be especially 
compelling. It must be far more than would be required to place a child in foster 
care, which is typically an imminent risk to a child’s physical health or safety that 
is avoidable only by placing the child in state custody.300 And presumably it must 
be more than would be required to place a juvenile under house arrest, which is 
proof that the juvenile has committed a crime and poses a danger to the 
community.301 It is not enough that a child might benefit in some ways. Prison is 
different. It is different for a teenager, and it is different for an infant. In any case, 
as explained in Part II, states simply do not have evidence of any benefits; in fact, 
the weight of evidence points to a conclusion that prison nurseries are more 
harmful than beneficial to children, even relative to the status quo, and a far worse 
alternative than placement for adoption.302 
 
3.  Does the Parent-Child Context Warrant a Special Exception? 
 
Prison nursery programs differ from the pretrial detention at issue in Schall 
and from the custodial retention of alien minors in Reno in that, with prison 
nurseries, a legal parent is waiting for the babies in the facility in which the state is 
placing the child. Incarceration of the child thus has the effect of uniting the child 
with a legal parent rather than separating the two; that is the whole purpose. How 
does this affect the analysis? 
                                                     
298 Id. at 269. 
299 See id. at 265–66. 
300 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-129(B)(1) (West 2003) (stating that 
removal is necessary to ensure a child’s safety when the child is in immediate danger); 
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1028(b) (McKinney 2009 & Supp. 2013) (outlining what a court 
should consider when determining whether it is necessary to temporarily remove a child to 
avoid an imminent risk to the child’s life or health); VA CODE ANN. § 16.1-251(A)–(C) 
(2010 & Supp. 2013) (detailing emergency removal procedures where a child is “taken into 
immediate custody and placed in shelter care pursuant to an emergency removal order”). 
301 See, e.g., In re M.E.B., 569 S.E.2d 683, 686 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that 
house arrest is an appropriate disposition only when a juvenile has committed a relatively 
serious crime). 
302 See supra Part II. 
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The presence of a competing constitutional right sometimes alters 
constitutional analysis.303 Incarcerated parents, however, have no competing 
constitutional right to bring their children into prison.304 If they did, prisoners, 
male and female, would deluge courts across the United States with litigation, 
demanding that their children of all ages be incarcerated to live with them. It has 
long gone without question that being sentenced to prison for committing a crime 
entails losing one’s right to physical custody of children.305 
The significance of the birth mother’s presence in the prison could therefore 
only be a factor in applying the test articulated above. Advocates for prison 
nurseries might contend that children are in imminent danger of substantial harm 
precisely by virtue of separation from their mothers. They would prefer that 
incarcerated mothers be transferred to a more homelike setting in the community, 
but unless the state does that, they might argue, incarcerating babies is the only 
way to protect the babies’ fundamental well-being. 
Given the strong constitutional presumption in favor of liberty and 
nonincarceration, the burden of proof falls squarely on advocates for prison 
nurseries to make this case. Making the case would entail demonstrating that (1) 
children of incarcerated birth mothers incur harm when they do not live in prison 
with the birth mothers; (2) living in prison with their mothers would avert harm; 
and (3) living in prison is the only way to avert harm. 
To demonstrate the first of these, advocates can and do point to the very poor 
outcomes for most children who live in the community while their mothers are in 
prison, much attributable to failure to form a secure attachment with any 
permanent parent figure. Pointing to statistics for a large population cannot suffice, 
however, to justify incarcerating the entire population. The state may not 
institutionalize everyone diagnosed with schizophrenia, for example, based on 
studies showing high self-harm rates for this population. Some children born to 
                                                     
303 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203 
(1989) (justifying CPS’s failure to remove an abused child by explaining that “had they 
moved too soon to take custody of the son away from the father, they would likely have 
been met with charges of improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship, charges 
based on the same Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present charge of failure 
to provide adequate protection”). 
304 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (upholding restrictions on 
prison visitation with children; applying highly deferential rational basis review; and 
stating, “The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does 
not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. . . . And, as our cases have 
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with 
incarceration.”); Delancy v. Booth, 400 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) 
(upholding exclusion of inmate mother from prison nursery program and stating, “The 
appellant has no constitutional or statutory right to raise the child in prison. Lawful 
incarceration limits many privileges and rights, a ‘retraction justified by the considerations 
underlying our penal system.’”). 
305 Overton, 539 U.S. at 131. 
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incarcerated women have good lives without ever living in prison,306 and for some 
who have poor outcomes, it is not because of the mother’s incarceration. There is 
variability in this population as to what the alternative to maternal custody is, at 
what time of life and for how long separation occurs, what caused the birth mother 
to be in prison, and other factors. Children’s procedural due process right requires 
an individualized assessment. 
To demonstrate the second point, that imprisonment averts harm, advocates 
would need to establish that prison babies generally have better outcomes—that 
prison nurseries are effective in avoiding the harm supposed to befall this 
population of children in the community. As explained in Part II, they cannot show 
this. In fact, starting life in prison appears to be even worse for these children—
because of the nature of prison life, because they experience the trauma of 
separating from their birth mothers after beginning the attachment process with 
them, because they end up in the same bad situations in the community after 
separating from their mothers, and because they will always view prison as their 
home of origin. 
To demonstrate the third proposition, that imprisonment is the only way to 
avert harm, advocates would need to satisfy a sort of “least restrictive 
environment” test, as the state must do when it places a juvenile charged with 
delinquency in a secure facility, civilly commits a mentally ill person, confers 
guardianship powers with respect to an elderly adult with diminished capacity, or 
makes school placement decisions for children with disabilities.307 They would 
need to show not only that imprisonment with a birth mother is better for a baby 
than living in temporary care in the community, but also that no reasonably 
available alternative to incarceration would be at least as effective as incarceration 
in avoiding the supposed harm to the children. And this they clearly cannot do. The 
state could easily place children born to incarcerated women in good, permanent 
homes where the children would be quite likely to have very good lives, far better 
than the prisons and their birth mothers can provide, by immediately placing them 
with adoptive parents. 
                                                     
306 See Delancy, 400 So. 2d at 1270 (upholding the exclusion of a child based on 
finding that placement with his grandmother would be better for him under a later-repealed 
Florida prison nursery statute, which required an individualized determination that 
placement of a child in prison was in his or her best interests). 
307 See Cruz v. Collazo, 84 F.R.D. 307, 313 (D.P.R. 1979) (stating that the federal 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 “embraces the principle of the 
least restrictive alternative” for juvenile dispositions); Valerie L. Corzine et al., Colorado 
Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services and Least Restrictive Environment, 39 
COL. LAW. 35 (2010) (discussing the least restrictive environment test in the context of 
guardianship and civil commitment proceedings); Theresa M. DeMonte, Comment, 
Finding the Least Restrictive Environment for Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An Analysis 
and Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 158 (2010) (discussing the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act and how it entitles children with disabilities “to 
individualized educations in the least restrictive environment”). 
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There is no warrant, therefore, for creating a new exception to constitutional 
limitations on the state’s power to incarcerate or civilly commit persons, one that 
would save prison nurseries from the otherwise ineluctable conclusion that they 
violate children’s constitutional rights to liberty and due process. That a child’s 
biological parent is in prison is not a good reason from a child welfare perspective, 
let alone a compelling justification, for making the child live in prison too. 
 
4.  Statutory Limitations 
 
It was once common for states to place juveniles charged with crimes in the 
same prisons that housed adults charged or convicted of crimes.308 Based on a 
perception that this was harmful for juveniles, because the harsh atmosphere of 
adult prison was antithetical to the state’s rehabilitative aims for juvenile detention 
and because adult inmates pose a danger to vulnerable youths, a national consensus 
emerged decades ago that (1) juveniles should be spared as much as possible from 
any detention in state institutions, and (2) when juveniles must be placed in a state 
facility, it must be entirely separate from facilities for adults, and the juveniles 
should have no contact with adult criminals.309 This consensus ultimately produced 
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (the “Act”).310 The 
Act imposes on states, as a condition for receiving federal money aimed at 
preventing delinquent youths from becoming lifelong criminals, a 
“deinstitutionalization mandate.” 
Under the Act, minors who have not broken any law but are “dependent, 
neglected, or abused,” as well as those who have committed only “status 
offenses”—that is, violations of legal prohibitions applicable only to minors, such 
as curfew violations or truancy—“shall not be placed in secure detention facilities 
or secure correctional facilities.”311 Juveniles who have committed crimes may be 
placed in a detention facility, but they may not be confined in any facility housing 
adult inmates or otherwise have any contact with adult inmates.312 The Act 
repeatedly expresses congressional intent that minors should never have any 
contact with incarcerated adults,313 and it makes no distinction between male and 
female adult inmates. 
Consistent with the federal Act, states, including all those in which prison 
nurseries currently exist, have enacted laws and regulations to effectuate this 
deinstitutionalization mandate.314 Many echoed the conclusions regarding youth 
                                                     
308 Douglas E. Abrams, Lessons from Juvenile Justice History in the United States, 4 
J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 7, 8–9 (2004).  
309 Id. at 10–13. 
310 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5792a (2012). 
311 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(B) (2006). 
312 Id. § 5633(12). 
313 Id. § 5633(12)(A), (13)(A), (13)(B)(i)(I). 
314 See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 / 17a-5 (2012); IND. CODE § 31-37-4-4 (2012); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-3503, 43-2404.02 (LexisNexis 2011); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 4.80 
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well-being that underlie the federal law. Nebraska, for example, announced 
legislative findings that “the incarceration of juveniles in adult jails, lockups, and 
correctional facilities is contrary to the best interests and well-being of juveniles 
and frequently inconsistent with state and federal law requiring intervention by the 
least restrictive method.”315 
Prison nurseries straightforwardly contravene the Act’s prohibition on 
placement of children who have violated no law in secure facilities. They also 
violate the provision mandating that no juvenile be “detained or confined” in any 
adult prison or have any contact with adult inmates.316 Congress did not have 
prison nurseries in mind when it passed the Act, but the plain meaning of the Act’s 
language makes it applicable to all children and thus to prison nurseries; it 
proscribes any state action by which children who have committed no crime are 
“placed in secure detention facilities or secure correctional facilities” or are 
“detained or confined in any jail.”317 Moreover, prison nurseries present the same 
dangers to which the federal law was a reaction; babies in prison routinely interact 
with numerous adult criminals and therefore are at risk of physical or verbal attack 
and of being influenced in a way that makes them more likely to become criminals 
later in life. 
 
B.  May the State Empower Parents to Place Children in Prisons? 
 
In defense of prison nurseries, states might argue that they themselves do not 
place children in prisons but rather merely permit parents to place their children in 
prison. The Supreme Court and lower courts have held in some contexts, discussed 
                                                     
(McKinney 2010); 2001 Bill Text NY S.B. 4904 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 5119.66, 5139.11(K)(2)(g) (amended 2011); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 26-11A-1, 26-11A-
6 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.037 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE §§ 15-9-1 to -5 
(2013); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-121h. 
315 NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2403 (LexisNexis 2011). 
316 42 U.S.C. § 5633(12). 
317 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(11)(A)–(B), (a)(13). The Act does not define “juvenile.” 
Dictionaries define the noun as “a young person,” “a child,” and “a person who is not yet 
old enough to be legally considered an adult.” See e.g., Juvenile, FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/juvenile (last visited Apr. 6, 2014); Juvenile, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/juvenile (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2014); Juvenile, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definit 
ion/english/juvenile (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). The Act defines “jail” in a way that would 
include prisons. See 42 U.S.C. § 5603(22) (2006). Because prison nurseries were not the 
target of the Act, the federal oversight agency might not take action against them. But most 
courts that have decided the question have concluded that the Act creates a private right of 
action. See CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT: ITS DIVISIONS, 
AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS § 7:23, Juvenile Justice Act (Jon L. Craig ed., 2d 1996); Horn by 
Parks v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 
873 (1994) (mem.). Thus, a representative for an incarcerated baby, such as a biological 
father, could bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a state operating a prison nursery. 
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below, that it does not violate children’s constitutional rights for a state to 
empower their parents to seek their commitment to a secure facility. In nearly 
every case, the facility in question has been one for treatment of mental illness or 
disability. Obviously, with both prison nurseries and civil commitment of minors, 
state action plays a determinative role; the state must create or accredit the facility, 
confer the power on a parent, approve the parent’s choice, and transport the child 
to the facility. But in the civil commitment context, courts have found that the 
constitutionally protected authority of parents shapes the analysis of what rights 
the minors have. 
The leading case is Parham v. J.R.,318 in which children committed to a 
psychiatric hospital at their parents’ requests claimed a constitutional right to 
greater protection against such commitment.319 The Supreme Court did not decide 
in Parham nor in any other case what substantive test must be met to confine a 
minor in such a facility at the request of a parent; the Court has been called on only 
to assess the procedures involved.320 But the Court in Parham did affirm that 
children, like adults, have a constitutionally protected liberty interest against 
confinement,321 and it suggested that the confinement must be necessary to serve 
the medical needs of the minor.322 Significantly, the Court assumed that children’s 
interest in not being institutionalized is subverted not only by the physical restraint 
that confinement entails but also by any stigmatization that results from psychiatric 
institutionalization.323 Three Justices who partially dissented expressed the impact 
on children’s protected interests more vividly: 
 
Commitment to a mental institution necessarily entails a “massive 
curtailment of liberty” and inevitably affects “fundamental rights.” 
Persons incarcerated in mental hospitals are not only deprived of their 
physical liberty, they are also deprived of friends, family, and 
community. Institutionalized mental patients must live in unnatural 
surroundings under the continuous and detailed control of strangers. 
They are subject to intrusive treatment which, especially if unwarranted, 
                                                     
318 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
319 Id. at 588. 
320 Id. at 587. 
321 Id. at 600 (“It is not disputed that a child, in common with adults, has a substantial 
liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the 
state’s involvement in the commitment decision constitutes state action under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
322 See, e.g., id. at 608 (stating that “the decision should represent an independent 
judgment of what the child requires”); id. at 617 (directing remand to determine “whether 
every child in the appellee’s class received an adequate, independent diagnosis of his 
emotional condition and need for confinement”); id. at 618 (finding “no evidence that the 
State, acting as guardian, attempted to admit any child for reasons unrelated to the child’s 
need for treatment”).  
323 See id. at 601. 
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may violate their right to bodily integrity. . . . Furthermore, as the Court 
recognizes, persons confined in mental institutions are stigmatized as 
sick and abnormal during confinement and, in some cases, even after 
release.  
Because of these considerations, our cases have made clear that 
commitment to a mental hospital “is a deprivation of liberty which the 
State cannot accomplish without due process of law.”  
. . . .  
Indeed, it may well be argued that children are entitled to more 
protection than are adults. The consequences of an erroneous 
commitment decision are more tragic where children are involved. . . . 
[C]hildhood is a particularly vulnerable time of life and children 
erroneously institutionalized during their formative years may bear the 
scars for the rest of their lives.324 
 
All of these warnings about the threat to children’s welfare also apply to prison 
nurseries. 
The Parham Court held that commitment pursuant to the Georgia law at issue 
did not violate minors’ Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights, 
because the hospitals’ procedures for admission were sufficient to guard against 
parents’ illicit motivations or mistaken judgments, and it held that formal 
adversary hearings are not constitutionally mandatory.325 Crucially, the hospitals’ 
procedures ensured admission only after individualized review, independent of 
parents, by professionals with specialized training to determine the needs of each 
child, yielding a conclusion of medical necessity.326 Also important to the Court’s 
analysis was an assumption that some deference to the average parent is 
appropriate, as parents generally are inclined and able to do what is best for their 
children and because adversary hearings would deter some parents from getting 
needed help for their child.327 But the Court affirmed that there must nevertheless 
be an independent, professional assessment of the child’s needs.328 
                                                     
324 Id. at 626–28 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted). 
325 Id. at 612–13. 
326 Id. at 606–07, 614–16; see also Sec’y of Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized 
Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640, 649–50 (1979) (upholding Pennsylvania’s procedures for 
committing minors to psychiatric hospitals) (“We are satisfied that these procedures 
comport with the due process requirements set out earlier. No child is admitted without at 
least one and often more psychiatric examinations by an independent team of mental health 
professionals whose sole concern under the statute is whether the child needs and can 
benefit from institutional care.”). 
327 Parham, 442 U.S. at 602–04. 
328 Id. at 604 (“[T]he child’s rights and the nature of the commitment decision are 
such that parents cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide 
whether to have a child institutionalized.”); see also Colon v. Collazo, 729 F.2d 32, 35 (1st 
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Such an assessment is absent from decisions to place babies in prison 
programs. In addition, procedural protections for children whose parents want to 
have them placed in prison should be much greater, because the Parham Court’s 
crucial assumptions about parents’ ability and altruistic motivation cannot be made 
in this context, and because prison is a worse place to put children. Mothers in 
prison are not average parents but, rather, are a special subset whose severe 
deficiencies in ability to regulate their own lives belie any assumption about their 
ability to do what is best for a dependent child. Moreover, unless and until the state 
decides that a child will be placed in the mother’s custody in prison, she does not 
possess the decision-making rights of legal custody for which normal parents in 
the community receive constitutional protection. Mothers in prison are also much 
more likely than the average parent to act for selfish reasons in deciding whether 
their child will be confined; incarcerated women can vastly improve their own 
personal situation practically and psychologically by moving from the general 
population to a nursery and having their babies imprisoned with them. Whereas 
one might assume a parent would petition to have a child placed in a psychiatric 
hospital only against inclination and after intense internal struggle, for a troubled 
woman in jail who just gave birth it seems safe to assume that her selfish reasons 
for wanting to keep the baby with her would easily overwhelm any thoughts she 
might have that the child would be better off living in the community with a 
relative or being adopted. Relatedly, the Parham Court’s fear of deterring a parent 
from requesting needed help is simply inapplicable in this context.329 
Thus, even if one views the situation as one in which the state merely 
approves a parental request for institutionalization, rather than itself deciding to 
place a child in prison, the Parham decision and its rationale do not support a test 
for placement of children in adult prisons that is less rigorous than that dictated by 
the incarceration and adult civil commitment doctrines analyzed above. Arguably 
the test should be more stringent, or placement of children in prison should be 
categorically impermissible, as the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act suggests it should be.330 In any event, all existing nursery programs fail even 
the test for civil commitment, and they must therefore be terminated. 
In sum, regardless of how they are conceptualized, all extant prison nursery 
programs in the United States violate the substantive and procedural constitutional 
rights of children and contravene the command of federal legislation prohibiting 
housing of minors in adult prisons. Any legal challenge to them by a representative 
for an imprisoned baby should result in immediate closure. Less clear is how a 
legal challenge could arise. In a state like New York, where it appears a father’s 
consent is irrelevant,331 a disgruntled father might serve as such a representative. 
                                                     
Cir. 1984) (upholding commitment that occurred only after extensive investigation of 
minors’ family and personal background and that was subject to periodic review by social 
workers, psychologists, and supporting staff). 
329 See Parham, 442 U.S. at 610. 
330 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5792a (2012). 
331 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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Otherwise, a concerned adult or organization would need to convince a court to 
confer representational status.332 
 
V.  CHILDREN AS MEANS TO OTHERS’ ENDS 
 
Advocacy for children-in-prison programs comes from liberal supporters of 
incarcerated women. Conservatives jump on board when duped into believing that 
such programs reduce crime and therefore taxpayer expense of operating prisons. 
For both groups, support for bringing children into adult prisons comes without 
empirical support for claims that this is good for children and despite numerous 
reasons for believing it bad for children. It comes without rigorous examination of 
what little empirical study has been done of effects on children. It comes without 
consideration of whether children have legal rights precluding the states from 
putting them in prison. It comes with no mention of the alternative of adoption. 
And it comes with little dissent. The conclusion is inescapable that in this context, 
for nearly all who take an interest in incarcerated women, the welfare of children is 
subordinate to the aim of improving these women’s lives or otherwise serving 
interests other than those of children. 
Consider one example in the legal academy. Professor Desiriee Kennedy has 
perhaps written more about this issue than any other law professor. Her depiction 
of incarcerated mothers reads like an indictment of them as parents. She writes,  
 
Incarcerated women are more likely to be . . . young, poor, less 
educated and largely unskilled. Mothers in prison are often dealing with 
addiction and report higher rates of substance abuse than incarcerated 
men. Incarcerated women are also more likely than imprisoned fathers to 
be struggling with mental health issues. Women in prison report 
significantly higher incidences of child abuse and domestic violence as 
compared to men. Typically, the available services are insufficient to 
meet the needs of these populations. . . .  
. . . [I]t is very likely that their crimes may be related to the stress of 
raising children, providing for their families, and merely surviving. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . These families may be trapped in a cycle of poverty, addiction, 
child and domestic abuse, and mental illness . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [M]any incarcerated women [are] dealing with a number of 
complicated and interrelated psychological and mental health problems 
that are impossible to address in the time periods prescribed by state and 
                                                     
332 On the legal rules for acquiring representative status for a child, see James G. 
Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education 
Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 
1321, 1466–74 (1996). 
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federal standards. Incarcerated women engage in high levels of drug and 
alcohol use and frequently have histories of mental illness and abuse. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Children of incarcerated mothers . . . . may be more easily 
pulled into a pattern of “intergenerational” crime and are more likely to 
engage in illegal activity. . . .  
. . . In fact, many come from communities that lack adequate 
housing, schools, jobs, and drug and alcohol treatment centers. The result 
is that these women may find it difficult to provide for basic needs and 
get the assistance they need to cope with the stresses of living at the 
margins of society . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Women from impoverished communities may have an even 
more difficult and stressful role in mothering their children . . . . Many of 
these women come from communities which present greater challenges 
to mothering and caring for their children than many other mothers. For 
example, . . . “[w]omen [in Harlem] spend an extraordinary amount of 
time escorting children, limiting their movement, and trying . . . to keep 
them away from the violence.” . . .  
. . . . 
. . . Mothers who are incarcerated may be faced with trying to find 
housing and care for their children, may have drug and alcohol problems, 
or may have a host of other social and economic problems . . . .333 
 
A rational, child-centered response to this depiction would be that the state 
should find other parents for any newborn child of these women, taking into 
account that a newborn has no established relationship with the mother, is readily 
adoptable, and needs a healthy, stable, nurturing permanent caregiver in place 
within six months. Yet Kennedy concludes from the severe difficulties and 
dysfunctions of these women that the state should be more protective of their role 
as parents. She argues against termination of parental rights and in favor of more 
prison nurseries from a “critical race feminist” perspective,334 arguing that TPR 
“should be viewed as a gendered and political act with community-wide 
ramifications”335 and should be opposed because it “not only removes children 
from their communities but disempowers the mother whose only source of 
potential power or status may be as a mother, and disempowers communities by 
removing their youth.”336 In this view, the child functions largely like a therapy 
                                                     
333 Kennedy, supra note 18, at 169–200 (citations omitted). 
334 Id. at 166. 
335 Id. at 167. 
336 Id. at 197; see also Roberts, supra note 19, at 1499–50 (characterizing TPR as 
punishment of mothers) (“An analysis of the intersection of prison and foster care in black 
women’s lives shows how punishing black mothers is pivotal to the joint operation of 
systems that work together to maintain unjust social hierarchies in the United States.”); 
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dog—something the state could give to a deeply unhealthy person to try to help her 
heal—not a person with rights of his own. The child also functions like a welfare 
benefit, a resource given to the poor in an effort to make their lives more 
tolerable.337 
Many other law review articles follow the same line of reasoning—in 
particular, articles complaining about application of Adoption and Safe Families 
Act’s 15/22 rule (requiring CPS to petition for TPR if a child has been in non-
relative foster care for fifteen of the past twenty-two months) to incarcerated 
women whose children live outside prison. The authors maintain that this timeline 
is too short, that incarcerated mothers cannot be ready to take custody of their 
children within that time period, because they are in prison and face severe 
challenges after release.338 But whereas a rational child-centered response to this 
reality might be that the state should terminate parental rights immediately, rather 
than waiting twenty-two months, so that the children can achieve permanency with 
good caregivers sooner rather than later or never, these authors instead argue that 
incarceration should be treated as a reason for waiving the deadline, giving 
incarcerated mothers much more time!339 They hardly address the consequences of 
that for the children; it is at most a superficial afterthought. For example, some rest 
on the point that after twenty-two months in foster care, a child is hard to place for 
adoption.340 This is true, but it again begs the question why the state does not 
terminate rights twenty-two months earlier.341 If the state knows when a woman 
                                                     
Vainik, supra note 12, at 676 (detailing severe problems in women’s lives before they 
entered prison, but treating this only as reason for sympathy). 
337 See Denise Johnston, Intervention, in CHILDREN OF INCARCERATED PARENTS, 
supra note 124, at 199, 206–09 (arguing that it is unfair to minority-race women to deny 
those with child maltreatment histories the opportunity to have their babies enter prison to 
be with them). 
338 See, e.g., Day, supra note 83, at 236–38; Roberts, supra note 19, at 1495–99; Ross, 
supra note 139, at 217 (“[I]t is hard to imagine how a parent newly released from prison, 
without an apartment or a job, whose kin were not available to care for the boy when the 
parent was sentenced, will be able to handle the stresses of parenting a demanding child 
while seeking to adjust to life after prison.”). 
339 See, e.g., ANNE HEMMETT STERN, BABIES BORN TO INCARCERATED MOTHERS 9 
(2004); MARGOLIES & KRAFT-STOLAR, supra note 6, at x–xii; Day, supra note 83, at 242; 
Roberts, supra note 19, at 1498–99; Ross, supra note 139, at 226–28. 
340 See, e.g., Ross, supra note 139, at 224. 
341 It also overlooks the fact that if there is no better alternative permanency plan for a 
child, TPR will not occur. The 15/22 rule only requires a petition, not an order, for TPR. 
The petition requirement contains broad exceptions based on a best-interests showing—
taking into account prospects for adoption—or on a child residing with relatives. In 
addition, courts are always precluded from ordering TPR unless they find it would be in the 
child’s best interests, all things considered, including potential for adoption. As a legal 
matter, there is no such thing as a TPR that is bad for a child. See Adoption and Safe 
Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, 2118 § 103(a)(3) (1997); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (2013) (“The family court may order the termination of parental 
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enters prison that she cannot parent her child for the next year or longer, because 
she will be in prison, and if it knows she will require indefinite additional time 
after prison to establish a stable and healthy life before she can assume custody, 
why does it not sever the legal tie at the time the woman enters prison, at least as to 
any infant children, so a court can quickly create an alternative permanency plan, 
such as adoption, that will enable the child to form an attachment to reliable 
permanent caregivers? To advocates for incarcerated women, it seems that 
possibility is unthinkable. 
If they gave serious attention to the well-being of children, scholars who 
bemoan the elevated rate of maternal incarceration would at least acknowledge that 
the best policy for a newborn might be different from the best policy for a ten-
year-old. They would at least recognize as a pertinent question whether a policy 
truly designed to do what is best for children should draw a distinction between 
children who were in foster care even before their mothers went to prison, because 
their mothers abused or neglected them, and children who were in their mother’s 
custody until she entered prison. But they contemplate no such distinctions. Their 
position is categorical and unbending: the state must preserve female prisoners’ 
parental status no matter what. Insofar as they have succeeded in advancing their 
position, advocates for female convicts have caused children to start life in a prison 
and then suffer rupture of whatever relationship they establish there with their birth 
mothers, and they have caused children to linger endlessly in foster care, never 
achieving family permanence. Their position is thus causing black children to 
become deeply troubled black teens who, deep in their psyche, view prison as their 
home. Remarkably, no one has studied the long-term outcomes for these former 
prison babies. 
A thought experiment should make even clearer the adult-centered focus of 
advocates for children-in-prison programs and their inclination to protect adults 
first and worry about children later or not at all. Suppose Washington revised its 
laws so that three years was no longer just the maximum stay in prison nurseries 
but also the minimum. In other words, suppose it became a condition for 
participation that pregnant inmates agree, regardless of how much time remains on 
their sentences, to remain in prison until their child’s third birthday, so that the 
attachment process can fully run its course under close supervision. Additionally, 
mothers must agree to spend another two years subsequently in a halfway facility, 
with substantial restrictions on and close monitoring of their movements and 
activities, including their socializing, and with compulsory job training and mental 
health services. The state’s aim would be to ensure that mothers who choose to 
deny their children the opportunity for adoption by healthy, well-functioning, 
                                                     
rights upon a finding of one or more of the following grounds and a finding that 
termination is in the best interest of the child . . . .” (emphasis added)); H.G. v. Indiana 
Dep’t. of Child Servs., 959 N.E.2d 272, 275, 294 (Ind. App. 2011) (overturning TPR as to 
incarcerated parents because the state had not shown it would be in the child’s best 
interests, despite the foster parents’ desire to adopt the child). 
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nonincarcerated people in good communities remain with the child and stay drug-
free in a safe environment at least until the child reaches school age. Thus, a 
woman scheduled for release from prison one year after giving birth would have to 
agree to an additional four years of confinement and supervision if she wants to 
keep her baby. 
Prison nursery advocates assert that the prison environment is not so bad for 
children and is in any case better than the neighborhoods the mothers came 
from.342 None object that Washington’s three years is too long for children to live 
in prison. Even proponents of the nurseries concede the high risk of separation and 
attachment disruption upon reentry.343 So what response would they have to this 
hypothetical new policy? Would they endorse it as a promising strategy for 
improving outcomes for children, one that lowers the alarming rate of separation? 
Would they be receptive to an argument that this policy is also good for the 
mothers, as it makes it more likely they will stay on a positive path in life? That is 
unimaginable. Undoubtedly, they would reject the policy outright simply because 
it is coercive and an additional incursion on women’s liberty, and they would 
struggle to find some reason why it is actually not better for the children. 
What explains this implicit lexical prioritizing of adults’ interests over 
children’s welfare? Liberal advocates for incarcerated women would undoubtedly 
in many other contexts strongly support programs that are clearly aimed solely at 
improving child welfare, even at the cost of an increased tax burden, such as 
subsidized child care, Head Start, and free school lunches. But those are contexts 
in which there is no conflict of interests between children and parents. In the 
context of parental incarceration, in contrast, there clearly is a potential conflict of 
interests, because the adults at issue are predominantly among the most 
dysfunctional people in our society, the least able to care for a child. And they are 
in a place, adult prison, that has generated national legislation commanding that 
children never be housed in it. This context clearly raises the question of whether 
the children should even be in a legal relationship with the adults, a negative 
answer to which would likely cause suffering to the adults. The conflict of interests 
between adults and children is plain. Yet the strong inclination of liberals in 
particular is to deny that any conflict exists, develop a policy position that protects 
the adults’ interests, and then endeavor mightily to explain why that position does 
not sacrifice the welfare of the children. 
In this respect, advocacy for prison nurseries epitomizes a broader 
phenomenon among scholars, advocates for historically subordinate groups, and 
people in general—namely, to view the relationship between biological parents 
and children as unlike almost any other good in adults’ lives, including adults’ 
relationships with other adults. They view the relationship as unique in two 
ways—first, as normatively different, insofar as it is something many believe 
adults are entitled to even in circumstances when they are entitled to almost 
                                                     
342 See supra notes 78, 85–86, 91,149 and accompanying text. 
343 See, e.g., Byrne et al., supra note 39, at 387. 
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nothing else, especially if the adults are viewed as victims of social injustice;344 
and second, as empirically different, insofar as children are viewed relative to their 
biological parents as something other than distinct persons, as if they are a part of 
biological mothers’ very self, or objects of ownership rights.345 These untenable 
views explain why immediate placement of babies born to prison inmates in 
adoptive homes is never an option considered in the law, policy, and social science 
literature relating to female criminals, even though that option would provide 
nearly all of these babies with vastly better life prospects. 
In addition to denying that any conflict of interests exists between 
incarcerated women and their children, advocates for children-in-prison programs 
might point out that these women would not be incarcerated in the first place if the 
legal response to their problems were less punitive, if the communities from which 
the women came offered more opportunities for healthy and productive lives, if 
better treatment for addiction were available to these women, if the state did more 
to prevent domestic violence, and in general if life were more fair. All that 
counterfactual speculation might be true, but it is morally and legally irrelevant to 
what the state ought to do with a child whose mother is incarcerated in this far-
from-perfect world that actually exists. It is fallacious to reason that if something 
would not happen in a better world then it should not happen in the actual world. 
Adults are entitled to make choices about their relationships based on real-world 
circumstances—for example, ending an intimate relationship with a woman 
because she goes into prison. Children are entitled to have the state make the best 
decision for them about their family relationships, based on real-world 
circumstances and the options available to them, including adoption.346 
 
 
                                                     
344 See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER 
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999) (discussing “blood bias” that causes 
state actors and others to attribute to biological parents rights to possession of their children 
even when it is harmful to them); Stone, supra note 129 (commenting that “[s]o strong is 
the conviction that mothers have an inherent right to parent”). Some former prison inmates 
in Canada were bold enough to file suit against the province of British Columbia arguing 
that cancellation of a prison nursery program there in 2008, because of perceived dangers 
to the children from inmate fighting and drug use, violated the fundamental right of 
mothers to have their children with them. See id.; Vivian Luk, Supreme Court hears case 
for Mother-Baby Program, GLOBE & MAIL, May 28, 2013, at S.1. 
345 This view of parenthood is not as archaic as one might imagine. See Bailey v. 
Lombard, 420 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (“Cases in New York State, 
culminating in Bennett v. Jeffreys . . . have shown that a child is no longer considered as a 
chattel . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
346 See generally JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006) 
(analyzing what rights children should possess in connection with state decision making 
about their personal relationships). 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATION 
 
To make clear what alternative legal regime this Article recommends, the 
following preliminary sketch is offered, limited here to the case of a newborn 
child: 
First, state laws should direct that when an incarcerated woman gives birth, 
prison officials must notify the local child protection agency, and that agency must 
conduct an assessment of the child’s situation and develop a permanency plan 
recommendation for the child based on that assessment. That assessment would 
take into account the mother’s history (including past parenting and pattern of 
intimate relationships); the mother’s current mental and physical health (including 
substance abuse); the time remaining on the mother’s sentence; the prospects for 
the mother’s successful reentry (taking into account family support, employability, 
plans for residence, rehabilitative progress, and need to assume custody of older 
children); and other possible permanent caregivers (including the child’s father, 
extended family members willing to adopt, and unrelated persons interested in 
adopting). 
Second, state laws should direct the child protection agency to initiate a 
juvenile court proceeding, and the court should order the permanency plan that is 
most consistent with the baby’s long-term best interests, taking into account 
several factors: the agency’s assessment and recommendation, the psychological 
benefit children gain when raised by their biological parents or at least by 
biologically-related persons, any evidence that the mother or other interested 
parties might present to the court, and potential adoptive placements. The mother 
should have legal representation, but so too should the child. 
Third, putting babies in prison should never be an option. If the mother is 
expected to leave prison within six or seven months, and if the court-selected 
permanency plan is for her to raise the child, the baby should be placed with a 
CPS-approved temporary caregiver until the mother leaves prison. If the mother 
has significantly more than seven months remaining to serve, and if there is no 
community-based residential program to which the mother can move, then 
presumably the permanency plan should not be for the birth mother to occupy the 
role of primary caregiver. 
Lastly, under any scenario involving placement of the child with an 
alternative parent figure, the decision whether that entails TPR as to the mother 
should depend on the identity of the alternative parent figure (e.g., family member 
vs. stranger) and other considerations. The best outcome for a particular child born 
to a prison inmate might be for an aunt to adopt the child, so that the child’s 
primary attachment figure has role security and the law can ensure that the birth 
mother and child have the opportunity to form a relationship with each other at 
some point. 
The foregoing is obviously not comprehensive, addressing every possible 
permutation and detail. The most important points include the following: (1) state 
actors whose normal function includes making assessments about and choices for 
children’s welfare (i.e., CPS and juvenile courts, not prison officials) should be 
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making such assessments and choices for babies born to incarcerated women; (2) 
the state should never choose to put a baby in prison; and (3) the state should 
immediately find an alternative permanent primary caregiver for any newborn 
child whose mother will be in prison for a substantial portion of the attachment 
period or for other reasons is not the best choice for the role of long-term primary 
caregiver (despite the child-welfare presumption in favor of her as a biological 
parent). 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Children-in-prison programs reflect a commendable sympathy for the lifelong 
disadvantage and deprivation that most prison inmates have suffered and a wish to 
transform their lives. But acting primarily on the basis of that sympathy and wish, 
rather than focusing realistically on what is truly best for children, is a moral and 
policy mistake. Available evidence suggests that the extreme form of connecting 
incarcerated birth parents with their offspring, prison nurseries, harms the great 
majority of those children, especially when the impact is compared to the life the 
children might have had if adopted immediately after birth. Advocacy for this 
practice depends on a pretense that there is no conflict of interests between 
incarcerated women and their newborn offspring and on misuse of empirical 
studies. It is ultimately grounded in a normative commitment to giving lexical 
priority to the welfare or happiness of those women. State actors need to recognize 
that advocates for incarcerated women are not reliable sources of information 
about the child welfare impacts of any policy, and they need to seek that 
information elsewhere and make children’s welfare the determinative criterion of 
their decisions. But this is likely to occur only when true advocates for children 
begin to take an interest in this quietly proliferating practice of putting children in 
prison. 
